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TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED
DISCLOSURE SYSTEM FOR ONTARIO
SECURITIES LEGISLATION*
By H. GARFIELD EMERSON**

I.

THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES LEGISLATION

Introduction
"Disclosure is and has from the outset been a central aspect of national
policy in the field of securities regulation."' There is no doubt of the accuracy
of this statement and its general acceptance today by those concerned in North
America with the regulation of the purchase and sale of securities. Nor is
there disagreement that the securities industry is a key industry both in the
* On June 1, 1972 first reading was given in the Ontario Legislature to Bill 154,
being a Bill to enact The Securities Act, 1972 (herein cited as "Bill 154"). Bill 154 proposes
to implement the main recommendations of the 1970 Merger Report of the Ontario
Securities Commission providing, among other things, for the concepts of the "reporting
issuer" and the cornerstone prospectus, or as it is referred to in Bill 154, the "cornerstone
statement." Bill 154 was introduced for the purpose of inviting study and public comment
before it proceeds further. While some provisions of Bill 154 may be changed prior to
enactment, Bi11°154 has been incorporated in this article as tabled in view of its relationship
to the proposals of the Merger Report.
** Member of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
1 Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under The '33
and '34 Securities Acts, Report of the Disclosure Policy Study to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (March, 1969) at 10 (herein cited as the "Wheat Report"). See also
the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H. R. Doe. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (herein cited as the "Special
Study") where it is stated in Part 3 at 1 that "the keystone of the entire structure of Federal
Securities legislation is disclosure."
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United States and in Canada that plays a central and primary role in the
creation of capital markets required to finance the development of each of
those economies. As has been succinctly stated, "public interest dictates that
the primary purpose of a securities market is to raise capital to finance the
economy. Without continuous capital formation, our economy could not
grow or prosper."'2 Conditions and practices in the capital markets, both the
new issue market and the secondary market, which best serve the investing
public and allow the investing public to have confidence in the securities
markets will, in the long run, best serve the economy as a whole.3
For almost ten years, United States and Canadian securities legislation
has been moving towards an integrated and continuous disclosure system
whereby issuers whose securities have been publicly distributed would be
required on a timely basis to prepare and file periodic public reports disclosing
material facts relating to the affairs of such issuers and whereby further
public distributions of securities of such issuers would be co-ordinated with
such disclosures. The progress in Ontario during this period has been substantial. The recent tabling of Bill 154, delineating the framework that is
proposed for Ontario's system of continuous disclosure, marks the final steps
to achieve this result in that jurisdiction.
While this article is not meant as an incantation of the virtues of disclosure,
it has been written with a preference towards disclosure as the proper approach
to the regulation of the distribution of and public trading in securities, as
opposed to what may be categorized broadly as the regulatory or "blue sky"
approach. It is submitted that to the extent that Canadian securities legislation
moves towards concepts of full, frank, timely and effective disclosure that
promote confidence, liquidity and increased participation in Canadian securities
markets, the better the Canadian investing public, and thereby the Canadian
economy, will be served. At the same time, a proper understanding of the
proposed continuous disclosure system requires an appreciation of the prior
developments and recent problems, both in the United States and Canada, that
have provided the foundation from which this continuous disclosure concept
has evolved.
While it is not necessary at this stage of development to re-argue the
case in favour of disclosure, it may be helpful to note in a general way four main
rationales upon which the disclosure philosophy is based. Firstly, those who
wish to make use of the public's money should be required to inform the
investing public of all facts essential to the formation of intelligent investment
decisions. It follows that the use of other people's capital demands the
responsibility to inform and to account. Secondly, the creation of free and
open public securities markets requires, in theory, that there be full and
honest publicity of important information in order that the competing
judgments of buyer and seller as to the fair price of a security reflects as
nearly as possible a just price and establishes a true market value for the
2 William McChesney Martin, Jr., A Report on the Securities Markets submitted to
The Board of Governors of The New York Stock Exchange (August 5, 1971) at 2.
3 See, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in
Ontario (March 11, 1965) at 7-8 (herein cited as the "Kimber Report").
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security. 4 A committee of the Ontario Securities Commission stated it this
way: "The purpose of the whole [disclosure system] is to provide an
equality of opportunity for all investors in the market place, sellers as well as
buyers. The object is to make available on a timely basis all material facts
the investor requires to make an informed investment judgment. ' 5 Thirdly,
disclosure, in providing material information to the public investor and
assisting in the formation of free securities markets, thereby creates the confidence in the market place that is essential to the efficiency of national capital
markets. The timely disclosure of the material affairs of public issuers aids the
efficiency of the securities industry in meeting tomorrow's ever-increasing
capital requirements. Fourthly, the requirement to disclose itself prevents
those transactions that cannot stand the light of public scrutiny, thereby
protecting the public and increasing the ethical standards of the market
place. As is well known, 'sunlight is the best disinfectant'.
The disclosure philosophy should be distinguished from the regulatory
or "blue sky" philosophy. Disclosure per se does not involve the regulation
of unsound or speculative issues. Generally speaking, under a disclosure
statute, such as the Securities Act of 1933, in principle, "a promoter may
ask the public to invest in a hole in the ground as long as he does not
without supporting geological data describe it as a uranium strike. But under
most of the state ["blue sky"] acts full disclosure of material facts is significant primarily in that it is supposed to equip the administrator to apply the
substantive or qualitative standards which his act specifies."'6 For example,
under some of the "blue sky" statutes of the United States, the state securities
administrator may refuse to issue a permit for the sale of specific securities
to the public in his state, if, among other things, he finds that the proposed
plan of business is not "fair, just and equitable." 7 In enacting the Securities
Act of 1933, the United States Congress chose the disclosure philosophy,
but not without debate which has continued to the present as to the efficacy
of pure disclosure.8 While the disclosure philosophy has predominated, it
has not been and is not advanced as a cure-all, either in Canada or the United
States. 9

The philosophy of disclosure was fully won in the United States more
than a generation ago with the enactment of a statute in 1933 "to provide
4 Wheat Report, supra, note 1, Ch. I.

5 Report of the Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission on the Problems
of Disclosure raised for Investors by Business Combinations and Private Placements
(February, 1970) at 15 (herein cited as the "Merger Report").
6L. Loss, Securities Regulation (2d ed. 1961, Supplement 1969), Volume I at 57
(herein cited as "Loss"). See also note 58, infra.
7 Id. IV Loss at 2230-32.
8 Id. I Loss Ch. 1G. See text commencing at note 257 infra.
9 Wheat Report, supra, note 1 at 48; Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.04.
See text relating to "blue sky" aspects of Ontario securities law commencing with
the text relating to note 49 infra. The Kimber Report, supra, note 3, para. 4.02 at 28 noted
that "disclosure, in itself, is not the complete answer to the problems faced by the investor.
The ethical standards of directors and management of business corporations and of persons
engaged in the securities industry are of great importance. The history of increasing legal
requirements as to disclosure has, however, been accompanied by significant improvements
and developments in these ethical standards."
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full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and
foreign commerce ... ."10 The primary purpose of the Securities Act of 1933
is, of course, to require that a company issuing securities to the public disclose to the public at the time of offering all material facts relating to the
company and to the securities then being issued. The Securities Act of 1933
is "essentially a narrowly focused but high-powered effort to assure full and
fair disclosure on the special occasion of a public offering.""1 The purchaser
of newly issued securities distributed to the public by an issuer, or the purchaser of already issued securities distributed to the public by a shareholder
in a control position to the issuer, is granted a favoured position and is
entitled to receive a prospectus at the time of purchase setting forth all material
facts relating to the company and the securities being offered.
The Securities Act of 1933 did not, of course, attempt to satisfy the
full spectrum embraced by the philosophy of disclosure. As noted above, it
is narrowly focused and does not concern itself with disclosure of material
facts in connection with subsequent resales of securities by the initial or
subsequent purchasers in the trading or secondary market. Accordingly, it does
not deal with the legitimate demands of purchasers of already issued securities
for continued disclosure of material facts relating to the company whose
issued securities he was then buying, unless the selling shareholder was in a
control relationship with the company. Nevertheless, the Securities Act of
1933 is a remarkable piece of legislation that has produced "disclosures of
amazing quantity and quality in the specific areas where its requirements
apply."12
To provide a continuing basis of disclosure to the investing public in
the secondary market in the United States, a separate statute was enacted
in 1934 basically "to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of
over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce....,u
In addition to regulating securities brokers and dealers and the securities
markets in which they operate, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided
a framework for continuing public disclosure at regular intervals of some
material information concerning certain types of companies. In outline, the
framework provided that established companies file annual, semi-annual and
current financial statements and reports and prepare appropriate proxy solicitation material and that the insiders of such companies file public reports on
their ownership and changes of ownership of the securities of the company
of which they are an insider.
10 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. s. 77 (1964) (herein

cited as the "Securities Act of 1933"). The first draft of the legislation that became the

Securities Act of 1933 was based on "blue sky" theory. See, J.M. Landis, The Legislative
History of the SecuritiesAct of 1933 (1959), 28 George Wash. Law Rev. 6.
11 Milton H. Cohen, 'Truth in Securities' Revisited (1966), 79 Harv. Law Rev. 1340 at
1340 (herein cited as "Cohen").
12 Id. at 1344.
13 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. s. 78 (1964)
(herein cited as the "Securities Exchange Act of 1934").
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Initially, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applied, basically, only
to companies whose securities were listed and traded on an exchange. This,
to some extent, codified and expanded the disclosure required by the then
existing rules of the New York Stock Exchange that had required listed
companies to file annual financial reports for several years prior to 1934 and
made such requirements applicable to the other exchanges. Coverage of the
reporting requirements was extended in 1936 to those unlisted companies
that had filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 and
whose aggregate value of the class of securities covered by such registration
statement amounted to at least $2,000,000 following the offering. It was not
until 1964, however, thirty years later, that the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 extended its continuing disclosure requirements to companies whose
publicly distributed securities were traded on the over-the-counter market in
the United States. Following closely the recommendations made in the Special
Study, 14 the Securities Acts Amendments of 196414a, among other things,
extended the reporting requirements for the first time to companies whose
securities were only traded on the over-the-counter market that had a million
dollars in gross assets and a class of equity securities held of record by 500
or more persons. 15
The necessity in the United States for this extension of the disclosure
requirements by securities legislation to include the secondary trading
markets is evidenced by the fact that at that time the corporation law reporting requirements of only 14 of the 50 States and District of Columbia required
companies to forward annual financial reports to shareholders, specific
requirements setting out the content for such financial reports were generally
non-existent and only two states required certification by a public accountant. 16
The English Experience
Disclosure is not and is not claimed to be solely an American discovery.
Nor did the Securities Act of 1933 "spring full grown from the brow of any
New Deal Zeus. It followed a generation of state regulation and several
centuries of legislation in England."' 7 Commencing with the English Companies
Acts of 1844 and 184518 sponsored by Gladstone, then President of the
Board of Trade, publicity as the most potent safeguard against fraud has
been a prime basis of English company legislation. 19 Since the 1845 English
Company Act that provided elementary mechanics for the filing of a circular
or prospectus with the companies branch on the issuance of shares to the
public,2o "the history of English securities regulation may be summarized as
14 Special Study, supra,note 1.

14a78 Stat.
15

565, 15 U.S.C. s. 781.

See, Hugh L. Sowards, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: New Registration
and Reporting Requirements (1964), 19 U. of Miami Law Rev. 33.
16 Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure (1964), 62 Mich. Law
Rev. 607 at 625 (herein cited as "Knauss").
171 Loss, supra,note 6 at 1.
18 Joint Stock CompaniesAct, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110; CompaniesClauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16.
19 See, L.C.B. Gower, The Principlesof Modern Company Law (3rd ed. 1969) at 307;
J. Peter Williamson, Securities Regulation in Canada (1960, Supplement, 1966) at 4-8
(herein cited as "Williamson") and I Loss, supra, note 6 at 1-7.
208 & 9 Vict., c. 16,s. 4.
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repeated attempts to increase the effectiveness of the required disclosure." 2 '
However, the Securities Act of 1933 did introduce for the first time the
requirement that the prospectus be filed with and subject to the prior approval
of an independent public agency charged with the duty of scrutinizing the facts
bearing upon the proposed issue before permitting the sale of the securities
to the public. The creation of such an outside authority of public control for
England based on the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
model was considered and rejected by the Jenkins Report in view of the "wider
devolution of control inherent in the British system." 22 Basically, in England,
because there is not a substantial over-the-counter secondary trading market,
new issues are generally qualified for trading on The Stock Exchange, London.
In the role of a national securities authority, The London Stock Exchange
evidently fulfills an undiluted "blue sky" function and its requirements regulating issues of securities are, from the practical point of view, much more
important than the applicable British statutory provisions.
The London Stock Exchange's stringent system of vetting and exercising
control over new issues which are admitted to quotation is in excess of the
legal requirements relating to public issues and includes the regulation of the
procedures of the issue, the constitution of the company and the conduct of
its affairs by the directors. In addition the Exchange may object to persons
connected with the issue or the management of the company who appear
to be unsuitable to the Exchange. 23 The combined self-regulatory requirements imposed by The London Stock Exchange and the English Companies
Acts 1948 and 1967 and the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958,
on the one hand, and the apparent public duty exercised by the English
issuing houses, or underwriters, on the other hand, create a system of disclosure and investor protection, which, according to some English authorities,
is equal to the American standards.2 4
Professor Gower was of the view at one time that "the protection afforded
21 Knauss, supra, note 16 at 612.

22Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (June, 1962) at paras. 227
and 228 (herein cited as the "Jenkins Report").
23 See, Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Issue of Securities in Great Britain (1969), The
Journal
of Business Law 1.
24
In connection with the preparation of prospectuses, the Jenkins Report, supra, note
22, at 84 noted that "counsel, solicitors and accountants consulted with respect to the
preparation of the necessary documents are bound as a matter of professional duty to do
their best to see that all is right." The Kimber Report, supra note 3, expressed the same
view: para. 4.06 at 29.
Recently, in the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission laid a
complaint against National Student Marketing Corp. and other defendants for violation of
federal securities law. Included as defendants were two prestigious law firms accused of
violating federal securities law by allegedly failing to disclose to public investors and to
the shareholders of National Student Marketing Corp. and of the other merging company
the contents of a "comfort letter" from the auditors of National Student Marketing Corp.
made available at closing. The "comfort letter" is alleged to have stated that significant
and, in effect, adverse adjustments had to be retroactively reflected in the financial statements of National Marketing Corp. that were forwarded to shareholders of the merging
companies and upon which such shareholders had approved the merger: SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. # 93,360 (February 3, 1972); National
Student Marketing, 5 The Review of Securities Regulation 913 (June, 1972) and Roberta
S. Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Law Liabilities (1972), 27 The Business Lawyer 1153.
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by the sponsoring issuing houses and brokers is probably more effective than
that of the American S.E.C. since the former will not imperil their reputations
by backing a scheme unless it is both fully documented and economically
sound. Similarly, the control exercised by the stock exchanges over the subsequent operations of the company, through the general undertaking and
the sanction of suspension of dealings goes some way towards rivalling the
S.E.C.'s supervision of corporate activities."'2 Subsequent events appear to
have changed Professor Gower's view of the co-ordinated efficiency of the
self-regulatory private agencies in promoting investor protection in England.
After commenting on the failure to implement the half-way recommendations
26
of the Jenkins Report, he comments:
And it is now widely acknowledged that continued reliance on private agencies will
not do. It is fair to say that dissatisfaction is in relation to take-overs rather than to
normal flotations, but, as the Jenkins Committee recognized, the two cannot be kept
wholly distinct. The trouble is that Queensbury rules not subject to legal sanctions
are inadequate to preserve a code of conduct, at any rate in the heat of a take-over
battle. No rules of disclosure, however all-embracing, no City Code, however clearly
drafted, and no Panel, however prestigious can really be an adequate substitute for a
single authority with statutory powers over the whole field of securities regulation....
What seems to be needed is a statutory body - a smaller (poor man's) S.E.C. - to
which would be transferred the functions in this field of the Board of Trade and the
Registrar, and which would be provided with a staff adequate to lay down rules and
to police them, and be armed with powers to co-ordinate and supervise the activities
of the private agencies.

Securities and CompaniesLegislation Compared
From the historical record, it would appear that companies leglislation,
not only in the United States but also in Britain and Canada, has generally
failed in the past to keep pace with the increasing and evolving needs of
shareholders, who are also investors, for adequate financial and other
information concerning the affairs of the company with which they are so
associated. 27 Corporate law and securities law have focused primarily on
different aspects of the shareholder's or investor's relationship to the company.
Accordingly, it has been through the progress made by the implementation of
recommendations to revise securities laws that the advances and the required
disclosure of and access to essential data has generally been provided to the
shareholder qua investor. 28 As the references in this article show, in the
25 L.C.B. Gower, The Principlesof Modern Company Law (2d ed. 1957) at 289.
2
6 L.C.B. Gower, The Principlesof Modern Company Law (3rd ed. 1969) at 310.
27 See, Edwin C. Harris, Access to Corporate Information in Studies in Canadian
Company Law (1967) edited by 1.S. Ziegel.
28 For example, prior to 1966, The CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 71, s. 84(1)(a)
only required the statement of profit and loss submitted to shareholders to disclose "the
operating profit or loss before including or providing for other items of income or expense
that are required to be shown separately." The Kimber Report, supra, note 3, recommended
that the legislation be amended to require disclosure of sales or gross revenues: paras. 4.15
to 4.18. By The CorporationsAmendment Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 28, s. 8(1), "sales or
gross operating revenue" was required to be disclosed in the statements of profit and loss
of public companies. A similar provision was made to the securities legislation: The
Securities Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 142, s. 121(I)(a) and s. 129(1)(b)(i). Again in 1970, the
Merger Report, supra, note 5, recommended that sales or gross revenues be proportioned
between substantially different classes of business, which recommendations were incorporated into Ontario companies and securities legislation in 1971: see, paras. 9.27 to 9.36
of the Merger Report and note 99 infra.
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1960's the strong emphasis on increased public disclosure of corporate
information arose not from the revisions of corporate law as such but from
the real needs of the public investor for essential facts on which to base a
decision to buy or sell. This development may have been influenced by the
enormous and relatively recent increase in the size of the investing public
which is continuously trading in securities - from 61 million shareholders
in the United States in 1952 to 31 million in 1970.29 There is every reason
to believe that a proportionate increase took place in the Canadian investing
public.
This is not to say that current corporate law developments are continuing
to ignore the rights of shareholders for corporate information. The Interim
30
Report of the Select Committee on Company Law of the Province of Ontario,
the Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada 3' and Bill
No. 66 recently introduced in the British Columbia Legislature to enact a
new Companies Act have each re-directed attention to shareholders' rights.
However, increased rights for shareholders in the corporate field have not
automatically expanded the area of corporate disclosure. The differing primary
purposes of corporate and securities laws lead one to question the recom29
Alan B. Levenson, The Role of the SEC As A Consumer Protection Agency
(1971), 27 The Business Lawyer 61 at 64.
30 The Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law (Ontario, 1967) did
not deal extensively with questions of disclosure presumably because the Kimber Report
and the amendments to The CorporationsAct (Ontario) had recently covered this area in
Ontario. See text in connection with footnote 69 infra. The Interim Report did deal with
important and related matters such as the independence of the auditor (Ch. X, s. 2), the
creation of an audit committee of the board of directors, a majority of whom must be
outside directors (Ch. X, s. 2, para. 10.2.8), the removal of auditors (Ch. X, s. 3) and
increased shareholders' rights in various areas, including the abolition of the restrictive
provisions of the rule of Foss v. Harbottle (1843), 2 Hare 461 (Ch. VII, s. 4). The Interim
Report also considered and rejected the proposal that the financial statements of all
companies incorporated in Ontario be filed in an office of public record on the ground that
there then was "no way of assessing the real social value from a public interest standpoint
of the harsh requirement that all companies, without exception, disclose their financial
affairs to the general public" (Ch. XIII, para. 13.1.7). The recommendations of the Interim
Report are now contained in The Business CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53; am. S.O.
1971, c. 26 and c. 98.
The audit committee concept has received recent recommendations by the accounting profession in the United States as a requirement for all public corporations in order "to
provide the auditors with a means of access to the board to preserve the auditor's independence in their relationship with management." See, Sam Harris, Proceedingsof the ABA
National Institute, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities (1972), 27 The
Business Lawyer (Special Issue) at 72-73.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently endorsed the establishment
"by all publicly-held companies of audit committees composed of outside directors":
Accounting Series Release No. 123, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5237 (March 23,
1972). See also, The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 1972.
31 The Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada by R.W.V.
Dickerson, J.L. Howard and L. Getz (1971) recommend that the details of financial statements and the particulars of items of financial information be contained in regulations to
the statute. This permits incorporation of future developments easily and recognizes that
"in recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the need to improve the quantity
and quality of financial disclosure required of corporations": Volume I, para. 326. See also,
Bill 154, s. 98, s. 99 and s. 100.
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mendation of the Merger Report that the proxy solicitation and information
circular requirements be removed from securities legislation and hopefully
continued with the same degree of quality in corporate statutes.3 2 Bill 154
has followed this proposal by omitting requirements for proxies nd proxy
solicitation. Admittedly little difference will result where the corporate issuer
is subject to statutes such as The Business Corporations Act (Ontario) whose
provisions and regulations follow those of the present Ontario Securities Act.
However all issuers are not subject to such requirements by their jurisdiction
of incorporation or documents of organization. More importantly, the proxy
solicitation material has been recognized as providing a route of timely disclosure directly to the investor that probably communicates information more
33
effectively than a prospectus or complex statutory financial and other reports.
Quoting from the Special Study, the Kimber Report reported that the
Securities and Exchange Commission described the proxy rules as "....

the

single most effective disclosure device in our whole statutory arsenal. ' 34 The
removal of the proxy and information circular requirements from securities
legislation would lessen the effectiveness of this important avenue of disclosure
and substitute the uneven and generally less effective provisions of various
corporate statutes and documents organizing unincorporated issuers.
II. DISCLOSURE IN A CANADIAN CONTEXT
Historicalto 1945

Canadian securities legislation per se commenced with legislation in
Manitoba in 191235 that regulated the issuance of securities and was based
upon the 1911 "blue sky" legislation of Kansas. By 1930 most of the Canadian provinces had adopted anti-fraud and licencing statutes governing
brokers and securities salesmen. 36 In Ontario, for example, The Security
Frauds Prevention Act, 1928 was a typical statute prohibiting any person
from trading in securities unless registered as a broker or salesman. The
Attorney-General of Ontario had jurisdiction to order that any application
37
for registration not be granted "for any reason which he may deem sufficient."
32 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.34.
33 1I Loss, supra, note 6 at 1027: "The proxy rules are very likely the most effective
disclosure device in the SEC scheme of things."
34
Kimber Report, supra, note 3 at para. 6.18.
35 The Sale of Shares Act, S.M. 1912, c. 75. It was unlawful under that Act for any
company to sell or attempt to sell in Manitoba any securities of any company not incorporated in Manitoba or registered in the province without first obtaining a licence from the
Public Utility Commission: s. 2. The Commissioner was required to issue a licence to a
company duly applying therefor if, among other things, he found the proposed plan of
business and contracts "provide for a fair, just and equitable plan for the transaction of
business, and in his judgment promise a fair return on the shares ... offered for sale . .
s.9. Cf. The Directors' Liability Act, S.O. 1891, c. 34, and note 38 infra.
36 For an outline of the history of Canadian securities legislation, see Williamson,
supra, note 19, Ch. 1 and I Loss, supra,note 6, Ch. 21.
37 S.O. 1928, c. 34; am. S.O. 1929, c. 51, s. 8(l)(a). The present legislation is basically
similar: The SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 7(1).
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The Security Frauds Prevention Act, 1928, however, concerned itself with
only half of the problem - the registration of brokers and salesmen and the
prevention of fraudulent acts in connection with trading securities. Following
the English precedent and applying the disclosure philosophy, the regulation
of the issue and sale of securities to the public was then governed in Ontario
under companies legislation. Commencing in 1907, Ontario required that
every public company, wherever incorporated, "the securities of which were
dealt in within Ontario," that offered securities to the public for subscription
was required to issue and file a prospectus with the Provincial Secretary containing the information set forth in the Act and to deliver a copy of such38
prospectus to the purchaser before the contract of sale became binding.
These prospectus requirements relating to the issue of securities to the public

39
in Ontario were continued in Ontario companies statutes until 1928. In

1928, the prospectus requirements contained in the Ontario Companies Act
were finally repealed and transferred to a new statute, The Companies
Information Act, 1928. 40 Under the provisions of that statute, every public
company was required to file a prospectus with the Provincial Secretary upon
the commencement of any business in Ontario, upon the sale in Ontario of
any of its securities, upon any material change in any fact set forth in the
last prospectus filed or upon the sale in Ontario of any issue of securities
other than in respect of which a prospectus had been filed.41 These two
separate statutes, The Securities Frauds Prevention Act, 1928 and The
Companies Information Act, 1928, provided when read together, for a
somewhat co-ordinated regulation of the securities industry. They continued
to govern the Ontario securities industry on this basis until 1945.42 Accordingly, during this period, brokers were registered under security frauds Acts
and disclosure of information to investors by issuers was left to the provisions
of the companies information statutes. However, upon the issue of securities,
43
the issuer was required to register as a broker under the security frauds Acts.
38 The Ontario Companies Act, S.O. 1907, c. 34, Part VII. The prospectus provisions

set out in Part VII of the 1907 Act were revised in 1912 when the 1907 Act was repealed
and replaced.
39 The Ontario CompaniesAct, S.O. 1912, c. 31, Part VII; The CompaniesAct, R.S.O.
1914, c. 178, Part VII; The CompaniesAct, R.S.O. 1927, c. 218, Part VII.
40 The Companies Act, S.O. 1928 c. 32, s. 10; and The Companies Information Act, 1928, S.O. 1928, c. 33; am. S.O. 1929, c. 50 and S.O. 1930, c. 38.
41 Id., s. 3(1).
42 The Security Frauds Prevention Act, 1930, S.O. 1930, c. 39; The Securities Act,
R.S.O. 1937, c. 265 and The CompaniesInformationAct, R.S.O. 1937, c. 253.
43 Williamson, supra, note 19, at 22.
With the consolidation and revision effected by The Securities Act, 1945, the
prospectus provisions of The Companies InformationAct, R.S.O. 1937, c. 253, referred to
above were unnecessary and were accordingly deleted by The CompaniesInformation Act,
1947, S.O. 1947, c. 16, s. 2. However, from 1947 to 1966, the Companies Information Acts
required "every company of a class prescribed by the regulations" to file a prospectus with
the Provincial Secretary before the sale in Ontario of an issue of securities. Ont. Reg. 125/47
provided that all companies must file a prospectus except private companies, companies
filing a statement or prosectus under The Securities Act and companies whose securities
were listed on a stock exchange. Such provisions were eventually repealed by The Corporations Information Amendment Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 29, s. 1.
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Securities Legislation Since 1945
With the enactment of The Securities Act, 1945, 44 which may be considered the first modem Canadian Securities Act, Ontario consolidated its
various statutes relating to the licensing of brokers and salesmen and to the
filing of a prospectus upon the issuance of securities to the public.
The Securities Act, 1945 introduced the definition of "primary distribution to the public" 45 and the recognizable prohibition against trades in the
course of a primary distribution to the public until "a clear and concise statement... containing a full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts...
has been filed with the [Ontario Securities] Commission and a written receipt
therefor received from the registrar." 46 While the form of the statement or
prospectus was prescribed by the regulations, The Securities Act, 1945 did
require a balance sheet and profit and loss statement, certified by the
issuer's auditors, as at the end of the last completed financial year, or as at
a date not more than 120 days prior to the date of the statement, whichever
is later.47 For the period from 1945 to 1966, it may be said that the only
significant developments of Ontario securities legislation were those concerned

with expanding and refining the principles of disclosure.48
44 S.O. 1945, c. 22; am. 5.O. 1946, c.86.

The impetus for the 1945 Ontario securities legislation was the Report of the Royal
Ontario Mining Commission, 1944 known as the Urquhart Report. See, J.C. Baillie, The
Protection of the Investor in Ontario (1965), 8 Can. Public Admin. 172 at 174. In moving
the first reading of the Act, the Attorney-General indicated that where securities registration was concerned the emphasis was to be on full disclosure and assurance that the
disclosure reached the purchaser: Williamson, supra, note 19, at 31.
45 S.O. 1945, c. 22, s. 1(j). The definition contained the dual aspect - trades to the
public upon issuance from treasury and trades of already issued securities from a control
position.
46S.O. 1945, c. 22, s. 49(l). The contents of the "statement" or prospectus required by
The Securities Act, 1945 were set out in the regulations. See, Ont. Reg. 95/45. With the
1947 revision, note 48, infra, the contents of the prospectus were prescribed by statute. In
1966, the prescribed items of disclosure were returned to the regulations on the recommendations of the Kimber Report, supra, note 3, at para. 5.15. See Ont. Reg. 101/67 and
currently, Ont. Reg. 794/70, as amended.
47 Id., s. 49(4).
48 The Securities Act, 1945 was repealed and replaced by The Securities Act, 1947,
S.O. 1947, c. 98. The 1947 revision was basically housekeeping. "There is really no difference in principle between the 1945 and 1947 Acts. The difference lies in the machinery
employed in obtaining full disclosure": O.E. Lennox, Securities Legislation and Administration, Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 1950 at 85.
The Securities Act, 1947 set forth 33 specific statutory items to be disclosed in the
prospectus and required directors, promoters' and underwriters' certificates to be contained
in the prospectus: s. 44(1). In addition the profit and loss statement of the issuer was
expanded to include the last 3 completed financial years and pro forma balance sheets were
permitted: s. 44(5)(b) and s. 44(8). If primary distribution was still in progress 12 months
from the date of the last prospectus, a new prospectus was required: s. 44(10). The
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 351 consolidated the 1947 Act as amended. By The
SecuritiesAmendment Act, 1956, S.O. 1956, c. 81, the prospectus was required to include
statements of earnings for the last 5 completed financial years and was permitted to contain
pro forma statements of earnings if the proceeds of the issue were to be applied to acquire
a business. The SecuritiesAct, R.S.O. 1960, c. 363 continued the 1950 Act as amended and
no major disclosure amendments were made until 1966.
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Ontario securities legislation since 1945 has not been, is not now and is
not proposed to be based solely on the principles of disclosure in connection
with qualifying securities for sale to the public by filing a prospectus. Commencing with The Securities Act, 1945, the Ontario Securities Commission
has had discretion to accept a statement or prospectus for filing unless, among
other things, the prospectus contained any statement, promise or forecast
which was "misleading, false or deceptive" or had the "effect of concealing
material facts" or unless an "unconscionable consideration" was paid or was
to be paid for promotional purposes or acquisition of property. 49 The Ontario
Securities Commission has on occasion publicly acknowledged this power
of final authority to accept a prospectus for filing. 50 The language of the
present section 5 ' grants the Director a discretion to accept a prospectus for
filing "unless" certain circumstances exist, at which point the Director would
seem to lose his discretion and be required to refuse the filing. Obviously it
is also a matter of interpretation and therefore opinion, to be exercised
judicially, whether such prohibitive circumstances exist in fact. By contrast,
it is mandatory to issue a receipt for the filing of a preliminary prospectus if
the preliminary prospectus complies with the Act and the regulations. 52 The
ambit of the discretion of the Director of the Ontario Securities Commission
in section 61 has not been subject to judicial review but it is clear that the
Ontario Securities Act is more than a full disclosure statute. While such discretion has in fact been exercised in the past largely in connection with
49S.O. 1945, c. 22, s. 52. Such provisions have been continued in substance in The
Securities Act, 1947, S.O. 1947, c. 98, s. 49, The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1950, c. 351, s. 44,
The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 363, s. 44 and The Securities Act, 1966, S.O. 1966,
c. 142, s. 61. By The SecuritiesAmendment Act, 1967, S.O. 1967, c. 92, s. 1(2), the Director
was permitted to refuse to issue a receipt for a prospectus of a finance company where the
plan of distribution is "not acceptable to the Director".
50 See, O.E. Lennox, SecuritiesLegislation and Administration, Special Lectures of the
Law Society of Upper Canada 1950.
The Merger Report, supra, note 5, noted at para. 2.05 that "although strongly
disclosure oriented, through provisions such as section 61 of the [1966] Act the Ontario
legislation provides a residual discretion. This affords the Commission the opportunity of

offering guidance through policy statements as to the circumstances under which this
discretion may be exercised." The Ontario Securities Act was referred to as a "blue sky"
statute by the Vice-Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission, H.S. Bray, Q.C., at the
Osgoode Hall Corporate and Securities Law Programme, March 4; 1972.
51 Section 61 of The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, states that "the Director may

in his discretion issue a receipt for any prospectus filed under this Part, unless it appears to
the Director that... ." This discretion is proposed to be continued by s. 80(1) of Bill 154
with respect to filing offering circulars of reporting issuers.
By contrast s. 15.23(1) of the Draft Canada Business Corporations Act set out in
Volume II of the Proposals for a Niiw Business CorporationsLaw for Canada, supra,
note 31, provides that the "Registrar may by order in writing refuse to issue a receipt
for a prospectus sent to him under this Part, if it appea's to the Registrar that. . . " Under
such a provision the Registrar's discretion would be totally different from that of the
Director of the Ontario Securities Commission and would be limited to his interpretation
or opinion whether the prohibitive circumstances exist and his refusal would have to be

based on the existence of such circumstances.
52 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, s. 35(2). See also s. 61 and s. 71 of Bill 154
to the same effect with respect to filing a preliminary cornerstone statement and a preliminary offering circular, respectively.
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speculative mining ventures and, to a lesser extent, with junior industrials,
the Ontario Securities Commission appears to have exercised such "residual
discretion" cautiously, responsibly and not restrictively and has "confined
the scope of its interference to policies and rules that few serious observers
would claim to be detrimental to the operations of the securities industry." 53
Bill 154 proposes to add another requirement to the "blue sky" approach.
To become a "reporting issuer", a company must file a preliminary cornerstone statement and a cornerstone statement with the Ontario Securities Commission and obtain receipts therefor. 54 Following the existing residual discretion
relating to filing prospectuses, "the Director may, in his discretion, issue a
final receipt for a cornerstone statement filed by an issuer, unless it appears
to him that . . .", among certain other things, "the issuer does not meet
such financial requirements and conditions as are specified in the regulations." 55 While it is not clear from Bill 154 exactly what this requirement
means because draft regulations are not available, the proposed legislation
would appear sufficiently broad to enable the Ontario Securities Commission to deny certain companies, presumably those with minimal financial
resources, the ability to seek public financing, irrespective of the degree and
clarity of disclosure to the proposed public investor of the financial condition
and affairs of such an issuer.
The discussion outlining the merits of this extension of "blue sky" control
by regulation and the existing public prejudice it is meant to remove does
not appear on the public record. It was not a recommendation of the Merger
Report. The extension of the regulatory authority by means of setting
"financial requirements and conditions" establishing which issuers may become
reporting issuers is a significant and questionable proposed change in securities
administration in Ontario because Bill 154 also proposes that only reporting
issuers will be permitted access to normal public financing by the use of an
offering circular. 56 In addition, while the primary exemptions from the prohibition against trading securities in the course of a distribution without an
offering circular appear to be available to all issuers, Bill 154 proposes that only
securities of reporting issuers purchased pursuant to those exemptions may
be re-sold without constituting a "distribution". 57 Accordingly, it will be
virtually mandatory for all non-closely-held companies to become reporting
issuers. -Those that cannot meet the "financial requirements and conditions"
imposed by regulation may find their access to outside financing severely
restricted.
53 J.W. Baillie, The Protectionof the Investor in Ontario (1965), 8 Can. Public Adndn.
172 at 232.

54

Bill 154, s. 59.

55Bill 154, s. 64(1)(b). It would appear that an amendment to s. 155 of Bill 154 is
necessary to permit the enactment of regulations contemplated by s. 64(1)(b). Cf. s. 155,
item 22 of Bill 154.
56 Bill 154, s. 69(a).
57Bii1 154, s. 93(3)(a) and s. 93(4)(a). The term "distribution" is proposed to replace
the existing term "distribution to the public": see, Bill 154, s. 1(1)10, and text relating to
notes 158 and 191 infra.
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By contrast, the Securities Act of 1933 is more firmly based on pure
disclosure.58 Under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange
Commission may refuse to permit a registration statement to become effective
where it appears to the Commission that the registration statement is "on its
face incomplete or inaccurate in any material respect" or "includes any untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be
'59
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.
As noted by Loss, "the heavy artillery provided by s. 8 is reserved for flagrant
cases" and very workable examination procedures have developed. 60 The same
comment presently applies to the qualification of issues with the Ontario
Securities Commission in practice, notwithstanding the residual discretion
contained in current legislation noted above.
Secondary Markets
The Ontario Securities Acts prior to 1966 provided scant authority to
regulate the secondary markets of already issued securities, apart from the
anti-fraud provisions and the power to licence persons engaged in the securities business. Ontario securities legislation from 1945 to 1966 may generally
be considered as Canadian versions of the Securities Act of 1933, focusing
solely on new issues and distributions from control groups. Prior to 1966
Canadian investors were without the benefit of provisions similar to those
contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governing the continuing
financial and other timely reporting requirements of companies whose securities had been distributed to and were freely traded in the public securities
markets. Viewed in perspective, the appointment in Ontario in 1963 of a
Committee on Securities Legislation to report among other things, on the
"working of securities legislation in Ontario" and "the degree of disclosure of
information to shareholders" 61 may be considered the turning point in Canada
of disclosure for investors solely through a prospectus on the special occasion
of a public offering to disclosure on a continuing basis by periodic reporting
of material facts. The thrust of the recommendations of the Kimber Report
was directed at filling this long-standing gap in the application of disclosure
policy between the new issue market and the trading market.
58

"The SEC, which reviews the registration statement, has no authority to pass on the
merits of a particular offering. The SEC has no general power to prohibit an offering
because it considers the investment opportunity to be a poor risk. The sole thrust of the
Federal statute is disclosure of relevant information. No matter how speculative the investment, no matter how poor the risk, the offering will comply with Federal law if all the
required facts are disclosed. By contrast, many state securities or "blue sky" laws, which
are applicable in the jurisdictions where the distribution takes place, do regulate the merits
of the securities." Carl W. Schneider and Joseph M. Manko, Going Public - Practice,
Procedure and Consequences (1970), 15 Villanova Law Rev. 283 at 291.
59 Securities Act of 1933, supra, note 10, s. 8(b) and s. 8(d).
601 Loss, supra, note 6, at 272. See also, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4936,
as amended (December 9, 1968), Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration
Statements.
In connection with filings in Ontario, see, T.O.P. Brown, Administrationunder The
Ontario Securities Act, 1966 (1969), 94 Canadian Chartered Accountant 24 at 27.
61 Kimber Report, supra,note 3, at 6.
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The Kimber Report succinctly recommended revised policy directions in
connection with continuing disclosure for investors by way of expanded
annual and semi-annual financial reporting, proxies and proxy solicitation,
insider trading and take-over bids. 62 As stated in the Report, its recommendations dealt "directly or indirectly with disclosure 63of information to investors,
that is to say, with the factor of public confidence."
In line with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and following the
recommendations contained in the Kimber Report, Ontario passed The
Securities Act, 196664 which contained for the first time continuing financial
reporting and disclosure requirements upon companies that had issued equity
shares to the public in Ontario after May 1, 1967 through a prospectus or
any of whose shares were listed and posted for trading on The Toronto Stock
Exchange. As stated by the then Director of the Ontario Securities Commission, "the need for additional financial disclosure, particularly where the
securities of a company are in the hands of the public, has ceased to be a
matter of debate. The questions being asked are only ones of degree and of
kind. '65 Basically, the Ontario Securities Act, 1966 required such companies
to forward to shareholders expanded annual audited comparative financial
statements consisting of a balance sheet and statements of profit and loss,
surplus and source and application of funds and semi-annual unaudited comparative financial reports 66 and to prepare and forward to shareholders
proxy solicitation material for meetings of shareholders 67 and required
insiders of such companies to file public reports on their ownership and changes
of ownership of securities of such companies. 68 The foregoing provisions did
not apply to companies incorporated under the law of the Province of
Ontario but identical amendments were simultaneously made to the Ontario
Corporations Act.69 The specific changes introduced by The Securities Act,
70
1966 have been reviewed in detail elsewhere and need not be repeated here.
Accordingly, The Securities Act, 1966 combined in one statute the disclosure
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 relating to new issues and trades
from control groups and the continuing disclosure provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 relating to certain companies whose issued securities
were publicly traded.
62 Id.,

Parts IV, VI, H and I, respectively.

63 Id.,

para. 1.17 at 9.

64S.O. 1966, c. 142.
65

Harry S. Bray, Q.C., FinancialDisclosureand Accounting Practice,Special Lectures
of The Law Society of Upper Canada 1968, at 251.
66 S.O. 1966, c. 142, Part XII.
67 Id., Part X.
68 Id., Part XI.
69 The CorporationsAmendment Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 28.
70

See, for example, R.C. Meech, Q.C., Prospectus and Registration Requirements,

G.E. Creber, Q.C., Take-Over Bids, Insider Trading and Proxy Requirements and Harry
S. Bray, Q.C., FinancialDisclosure and Accounting Practice, all in Special Lectures of
The Law Society of Upper Canada 1968; Harry S. Bray, Q.C., Recent Developments in
Securities Administration in Ontario; The Securities Act, 1966 in Studies in Canadian
Company Law (1967) edited by J.S. Ziegel.
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The continuing disclosure provisions introduced in Ontario by The
Securities Act, 1966 did not apply, however, to all companies whose securities
were distributed to or freely traded by the public in Ontario. Parts X, XI and
XII of The Securities Act, 1966 did not apply to a company whose shares
were not listed and posted for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange that
had issued debt securities or equity shares to the public, whether by way of
a prospectus or otherwise, prior to May 1, 1967, that issued debt securities to
the public, whether by way of a prospectus or otherwise, after May 1, 1967
or that issued debt securities or equity shares to the public after May 1, 1967
by way of an exemption to the prospectus requirements of The Securities
Act, 1966, as for example, by way of a private placement under section
19(3) of that Act.71 Accordingly a company whose shares were not listed
and posted for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange that issued debt
securities to the public in Ontario by way of a prospectus or that issued
equity shares to the public by way of an exemption to the prospectus requiremnents after May 1, 1967 was not subject to the financial, proxy solicitation or
insider reporting requirements of The Securities Act, 1966.
There does not appear to be any clear indication in the Kimber Report
that its recommendations were not to include companies whose unlisted equity
shares were issued to the public in Ontario by way of a prospectus prior to
May 1, 1967 or by way of an exemption from the prospectus requirements
thereafter or whose debt securities were issued to the public in Ontario by
way of a prospectus at any time. With respect to the latter point, the Kimber
Report specifically referred to the needs for disclosure of the long term
creditor.72 It would appear that constitutional problems were thought to have
prevented the Ontario Securities Act from seeking jurisdiction over extraprovincial unlisted companies that sought access to the Ontario capital
market prior to May 1, 1967, but this consideration does not appear as a
factor in Bill 154 which proposes expanding the financial disclosure requirements to a larger group of companies. 73 The expanded financial disclosure
requirements proposed by Part XV of Bill 154 are clearly needed in the
interests of investor disclosure. The Merger Report also recommended the
abolition of the distinction between a company that has issued "equity shares"
by way of a prospectus and one that has issued other types of securities and
this recommendation is incorporated in Bill 154. 74
III. DISCLOSURE FOR TRADING MARKETS
There is no doubt that all of the arguments in favour of full and complete
disclosure in respect of securities offered to the public on an initial distribution
71 See the definition of "corporation" in sections 100(a), 108(1l)(b) and 118(b) of The
Securities Act, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 142.
72 Kimber Report, supra,note 3 at para. 4.03.
73 Id., Part IX. See also, Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.35.

By contrast, see the definition of a "corporation" in Bill 154, s. 96(1)(b), the financial

reporting requirements proposed by Part XV of Bill 154 and note 157 infra. See, in addition, The Business CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53; am. S.O. 1971, c. 26 and c. 98,
s. 1(9), and as proposed to be amended by Bill 180, 2nd Session, 29th Legislature, s. 1(5).
74 The Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.36. Bill 154, s. 96 (1)(b).
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apply equally in respect of outstanding securities that are publicly traded in
the secondary market, either through the facilities of an exchange or over-thecounter. Indeed, the available data supports the proposition that in the past
the disclosure requirements of securities legislation were probably deficient
in not providing full, complete and continuous disclosure of material facts in
respect of all companies whose already issued securities were publicly traded
in ever expanding trading markets. The amount of money raised in the new
issue market is substantial. However, in comparison to the amount of money
changing hands in the trading markets for already issued securities, the significance of the new issue market has been over-emphasized in the application
of a disclosure policy. According to information compiled by the Wheat
Report, in the United States during the period from 1920-1967, inclusive,
the aggregate volume of new equity securities offered for cash was approximately 3.15% of aggregate exchange trading volume. During that period of
almost 50 years, investors spent approximately $31.70 on the purchase of
already outstanding listed equities for every dollar they spent on newly issued
equities. 75 Along similar lines, the Merger Report noted that new issues filed
with the Ontario Securities Commission in 1968 comprised less than 10% of
the value of securities traded on The Toronto Stock Exchange in 1968.76
Without in any way lessening the valid arguments in favour of full
prospectus disclosure in connection with the distribution of newly-issued
securities to the public and the special economic significance of such issues,
the trading markets of already issued securities are, quantitatively speaking,
of greater significance for the application of a full disclosure policy. This
unevenness in the application of a policy of full continuing disclosure for the
trading markets of already issued securities was commented on and constructively criticized in the United States in recent years. 77
United States Experience
The basic criticism of the United States federal securities disclosure
policies was that the combined application of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 failed to focus the light of disclosure
on the secondary market for the benefit of purchasers of already issued securities with the same intensity that it did for the benefit of purchasers of newly
75

Wheat Report, supra, note 1 at 58-59. This data relates only to equity securities and
does not cover trading in debt securities which are mostly traded, even when listed, on the
over-the-counter market. In addition, the lack of statistical information relating to securities
traded on the over-the-counter market requires use of exchange volume statistics as the sole
measure of trading market activity. This results in an understatement of trading volume.
76 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at 27, n. 51.
Canada'sCapitalMarket (1972), a study by Professors David C. Shaw and T. Ross
Archibald notes at 33 that "the characteristics of the secondary markets in Canada and
the transactions within them cannot be fully documented." The study reports however that
during 1966-1970 net Canadian stock issues averaged $579 million whereas the total market
value of domestic shares listed in 1966 on Canadian stock exchanges was $36 billion (Tables
4-4 and 4-5). The Toronto Stock Exchange 1971 Annual Review reports at 24 that
trading in 1971 in issues listed on Canada's six stock exchanges totalled $6.8 billion.
77 See, Cohen, supra, note 11; Knauss, supra,note 16; and Carl. W. Schneider, Reform
of the FederalSecurities Laws (1967), 115 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 1023.
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issued securities. As a matter of principle, the advocates of a continuing disclosure system argued for full continuous prospectus-type disclosure concerning companies that had issued securities to the public in order that purchasers in the trading markets might have available the same kind of material
facts in connection with a security on which to base a decision to buy or sell
that was afforded to a prospective purchaser on an initial distribution.
Accordingly, a company issuing its securities to the public should be required
to maintain the prospectus level of disclosure for the benefit of the trading
markets by means of timely current and up-to-date filings of material facts
with a public authority. Within the federal structure of United States securities
legislation, this aim could be achieved by coordinating and integrating the
continuing disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with
the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 required at the time
of the initial distribution. By this means, the information contained in a
prospectus would be continually updated in order that the public files would
contain, at any one time, information substantially equivalent to that contained
in a current prospectus. Accordingly, within the limits of practicality, it was
put forward that the continuous disclosure system of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 "should be solidified and strengthened in terms of quality,
currency, and accessibility of filed data, to the end that there may be available
in the public file at all times, in readily identifiable and accessible form,
substantially the equivalent of a current prospectus of every continuous
registrant." 78 As a corollary of this procedure, a further public offering of a
new issue of securities by a continuous registrant or "reporting company"
would not require a full prospectus duplicating information already appearing
in the public file.
The Special Study79 of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1963
also recommended the development of such a program of integrated continuous disclosure by companies that had made a public distribution of its
securities. As simplified by Knauss: 8 0
These recommendations [of the Special Study] move in the direction of reducing or
removing the registration and prospectus requirement for established companies, and
substituting for these requirements obligations of a stricter periodic reporting by the
companies, as well as disclosure by broker-dealers in all sales - not just the sale of
new issues. This approach stresses the importance of disclosure in the trading of
securities and conforms with the important objective of providing a free market as
an evaluator of the value of each security. Only the company selling securities to
the public for the first time should be required to go through a full registration
[prospectus] process. Commission investigation of these companies can become even
more detailed. Established companies should be able to file a short form registration
[prospectus] containing only data pertinent to the new issue. If a company desires
to use a prospectus as a selling tool, this document should conform to minimum
requirements; even here, however, a shorter, more flexible form of prospectus would
be possible.

On this point as well, the Wheat Report was also of the view that there
was "a need to achieve a better balance in disclosure policy, with greater
78 Cohen, supra, note 11 at 1406.
79
Supra, note 1.
8
OKnauss, supra,note 16 at 629-30.
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emphasis on continuing disclosure for the trading markets."81 As noted above,
the recommendations of the Kimber Report in 1965 and the enactment of
The Securities Act, 1966 were consistent with this objective. The Merger
Report noted that "with the implementation of the Kimber Report the
emphasis shifted from the particular issue being sold to continuing information
concerning the issuer."82
In November, 1967 the Securities and Exchange Commission formed
an internal study group "to examine the operation of the disclosure provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."83
The report of that study group was issued in March, 1969 and is known as
the Wheat Report. The Wheat Report accepted and recommended the concept of an integrated and continuous disclosure system under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by "reporting companies" as one which would provide
"continuing sources of disclosure which could act, to a larger degree, as an
acceptable substitute for the special and, at8 4best, occasional disclosures produced under traditional '33 Act practice."
In particular the Wheat Report made specific and important recommendations to expand the nature of the financial and material corporate
information to be filed by companies subject to the reporting provisions of
the federal securities laws as contained in Form 10 (registration form for
companies that did not file a registration statement under the Securities Act
of 1933), Form 10-K (annual report) and in a new Form 10-Q (quarterly
report).85 The heart of modem disclosure lies in timely disclosure of material
corporate events and in a fair presentation of the financial condition of the
issuer. The technical recommendations of the Wheat Report in these areas
are important because such disclosures provide the raw material and basic
financial and other facts to professional securities analysts and investment
dealers that they can absorb and use in formulating their recommendations
for the benefit of public investors. The intricate and complex financial and
corporate affairs of securities issuers cannot be appreciated fully by the
average public investor. However, through the "filtration process" of trained
professionals, the public trading market will benefit from such financial disclosures.
The Wheat Report recommended that the annual Form 10-K be amended
to provide that significant business and financial information be consolidated
and updated annually and that such report be filed within 90 days of the year
end. Specifically, it was recommended that each annual report include a five
year summary of earnings and statement of source and application of funds,
and, for companies in more than one line of business, a breakdown of revenues and of profits by each such separate line of business. It was also recommended that Form 10-K require disclosure of specific current developments
81 Wheat Report, supra,note 1 at 61.

82 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 1.20.
83 Wheat Report, supra, note 1 at 3.
84 1d. at 328.
85 Id. Ch. X.
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in a company's business, including an updating of information relating to
properties, pending legal proceedings and holders of equity securities, all
such annual disclosures to be coordinated and identified with documents previously filed.8 6 In order to provide more timely information, the Wheat Report also recommended the implementation of a new quarterly report, Form
10-Q, to be filed within 45 days of the end of each quarter, except for the
financial portion of the report which would not be required for the fourth
quarter. The use of the new quarterly Form 10-Q involved the repeal of the
then existing Form 9-X required to be fied 45 days after the close of the
first six months of a registrant's fiscal year and, in the opinion of the Wheat
Report, the repeal of Form 8-K, the current report required to be filed within
10 days of the end of the month in which a material event occurs, such as
change of control and acquisition or disposition of assets. New Form 10-Q
was basically to provide for condensed quarterly unaudited financial reports
similar to but in greater detail to that then provided on a semi-annual basis
by Form 9-X, with the addition of earnings per share data.8 7
Within six months of the release of the Wheat Report, the Securities
and Exchange Commission proposed the amendment of its Forms 10 and
10-K and the adoption of Form 10-Q basically as recommended. 88 In adopting the amendments to the annual return, Form 10-K, the Securities and
Exchange Commission stated that the purpose of the revision was to provide
that the information contained in the Form, together with that contained
in the proxy statement, will furnish on an annual basis a reasonably complete
and up-to-date statement of the business and operations of the company. The
revised Form 10-K requires that the reporting company annually disclose
within 90 days after the end of each fiscal year its principal products, services
and markets and describe any significant changes relating thereto, disclose
material and significant developments relating to competitive conditions in the
industry, the dollar amount of backlog of orders, on a comparative basis,
sources of raw materials, the importance of patents, licences and franchises
held, dollar amount spent on research activities and the numer of employees.8 9
In addition, revised Form 10-K requires disclosure by the reporting company
of its and its subsidiaries separate lines of business for the last five years,
setting out total sales and revenues and income before taxes and extraordinary
items attributable to each line of business which during either of the last two
fiscal years accounted for 10% or more of sales and revenues, 10% or more
of income before taxes and extraordinary items or a loss which equalled or
exceeds 10% of such amount of income, provided that if total sales and
86 Id. Ch. X, para. E.

87 Id. Ch. X, para. F. Form 10-Q as recommended by the Wheat Report and as adopted
by the SEC only applies to the first three fiscal quarters of each fiscal year. Bill 154, on the

other hand, proposes to require reporting issuers to file a report for the fourth quarter as
well: 88
s. 100.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Releases No. 8681, 8682 and 8683 (September 15,
1969).89
Form 10-K pursuant to s. 13 or s. 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Part I, Item 1(a) and (b).
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revenues do not exceed $50,000,000, the percentage specified becomes 15%
and not 10%.90
The Securities and Exchange Commission did not, however, adopt the
recommendation of the Wheat Report that the current report, Form 8-K, be
dropped and its items be included in the quarterly Form 10-Q. The Commission was of the view that the Form 8-K requirements 9' result in prompter
reporting of important events than would be the case if the reporting requirement were converted to a quarterly basis. 92
CanadianExperience
As more particularly referred to in Parts V and VI of this article, the
Merger Report also adopted the concept of the "reporting company" and
the filing of annual and quarterly financial reports. Unfortunately, the Merger
Report did not consider in depth the quality or kind of financial or other information that should be required to be disclosed by "reporting companies"
in their annual and periodic reports nor attempt to review the standard of
disclosure contained in a prospectus. The Merger Report "accepted the facts
available through a prospectus as the facts which are necessary to an informed
investment decision.193 While this assumption may be satisfactory in general,
it is unsatisfactory if it reflects a static attitude towards items of disclosure in
a continually evolving climate. The Wheat Report devoted Chapter HI to
the form and content of prospectuses and made the detailed recommendations
concerning the financial content of the annual and periodic reports now required to be filed by "reporting companies" in the United States as referred
to above. Bill 154 does not provide a glimpse of the extent or quality of the
disclosure in the proposed system for Ontario because the Bill proposes that
the form and contents of each of the cornerstone statement, offering circular,
annual audited comparative financial statements and quarterly unaudited comparative interim financial statements shall be prescribed by regulation.94 Pre90 d., Item l(c)(1). Form 10-K also required disclosure of the amount or percentage of
total sales and revenues contributed by each class of similar products or services which
contributed 10% or more to total sales and revenues in either of the last two fiscal years
or 15% or more if total sales did not exceed $50,000,000: Item 1(c)(2).
91 Form 8-K is required to be filed within 10 days after the close of each month during
which any of the following specified events occurs: changes in control, acquisition or disposition of a significant amount of assets, institution of material legal proceedings, material
modifications in rights of any class of security holders, material withdrawal or substitution
of assets securing any class of securities, material default in payment of any indebtedness
exceeding 5% of the company's assets, cumulative increases or decreases exceeding 5% in
the amount of outstanding securities, granting or extending of options on more than 5% of
the outstanding securities on a cumulative basis, material revaluation of assets and matters
submitted to a vote of security holders.
92
See, Daniel B. Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation (1971), 26
The Business Lawyer 1677 at 1682 to 1689.
93 Merger Report, supra,note 5, at para. 2.19.
94 Bill 154, s. 62(1)(b), s. 75(1)(b), s. 98 and s. 100.
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scription by regulation will, however, provide flexibility to change items of
financial and corporate disclosure to meet evolving conditions. 95

The Merger Report did consider financial disclosure in connection with
mergers and acquisitions. 96 In connection with financial disclosure relating
to business combinations, the Merger Report's recommendation for an
"acquisition equation" has already been enacted. 97 The "acquisition equation"
requires that the assets acquired be equated to the consideration paid. Basically, the assets acquired are segregated into the net tangible assets on the
books of the vendor plus adjustments to such assets to bring them to fair value
with the balance of the purchase price, if any, identified as goodwill. The

purchase price is divided into payments made from working capital, long-term
debt incurred and preferred and common shares issued. Similar recommendations were made by an exposure draft of the CICA Accounting and Auditing
Research Committee in November, 1971. In addition, the Merger Report's
recommendations that companies filing annual audited and semi-annual
unaudited financial statements disclose "basic earnings
per share" and "fully
98
diluted earnings per share" were also adopted.
The Merger Report also recommended that annual audited financial
statements required to be filed with the Ontario Securities Commission disclose, where the company carries on two or more classes of business that, in
the opinion of the directors, differ substantially from each other, the proportion in which the sales or gross revenue is divided among those classes of
95 For example, there is current debate in the United States whether earnings and sales
projections should be permitted to be estimated in a prospectus and other documents filed
pursuant to securities legislation and if so, on what basis or assumptions. See, Securities
Act of 1933 Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972). The Wheat Report recommended that
no change be made in the policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission not to permit
such projections: at 95-96. Ontario legislation permits estimates of future earnings with the
permission of the Director of the Ontario Securities Commission provided auditors or
accountants are not associated with such estimates: Ont. Reg. 794/70, as amended, s. 41
and s. 42. On the other hand, prospectuses and take-over bid circulars in the United
Kingdom invariably contain profit forecasts or projections. See, John Grieves, English
Profit Forecasts (1972), 5 The Review of Securities Regulation 919.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed amendments requiring
more meaningful prospectus disclosure on initial public issues and particularly new high
risk ventures to alleviate the problem of "hot issues". See, Securities Act of 1933 Release
No. 5276 (July 26, 1972) and remarks of William J. Casey, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. #78,905 (July 25, 1972).
96 Merger Report, supra, note 5, Ch. IX.
97 Id., at para. 9.17. The "acquisition equation" was enacted by s. 40 of The Securities
Amendment Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 3 1, and is now required in the annual audited financial
statements of companies reporting under Part XII of the Ontario Securities Act, infra,
note 101, by s. 126(3)17 of that Act. The contents of the "acquisition equation" are provided
for in Ont. Reg. 794/70, as amended, s. 82. Identical amendments are also contained in
The Business CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 53; am. S.O. 1971, c. 26 and c. 98,
s. 178(3)19.
98 Id., at para. 9.26. See, the Ontario Securities Act, infra, note 101, s. 121(l)(k) and (1)
and s. 130(l)(b)(vi) and (vii). Part XI of Ont. Reg. 794/70, as amended, deals with the
calculation of basic earnings per share and fully diluted earnings per share. A concurrent
amendment was made to Ontario companies legislation: see, The Business Corporations
Amendment Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 26, s. 28.
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business, provided that for companies with more than $25,000,000 in total
sales or gross revenue only those classes of business contributing 10% or
more to the gross revenue need be reported and that for companies with total
sales or gross revenue of less than $25,000,000 only those classes of business
that contribute 15% or more of the total gross revenue need be reported. 99
Substantially identical provisions have been enacted in the Canada Corporations Act, 100 the Ontario Securities Act and The Business Corporations Act.' 01
It is to be noted that the breakdown by substantially different classes
of business is required only for sales or gross revenue and is not required for
income or net profit. As noted earlier, the Wheat Report recommended that
the annual report, Form 10-K, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission include a breakdown of profits for separate lines of business and that
this was adopted in the United States. 02 The Merger Report was of the view,
however, that it should await the recommendations of the CICA Accounting
and Auditing Research Committee before adopting this increased financial
103
disclosure.
As noted earlier, 104 as a result of the recommendations of the Kimber
Report, companies subject to the financial disclosure provisions of Part XII
of the Ontario Securities Act were first required in 1966 to disclose "sales
or gross operating revenue" in their statement of profit and loss. The Ontario
Securities Act authorizes the Ontario Securities Commission, on application,
to make an order permitting the sales or gross operating revenue to be
omitted from the annual audited financial statements and the semi-annual
unaudited statements of "reporting companies" where it is satisfied "that the
disclosure of such information would be unduly detrimental to the interests
of the corporation."' 105 Bill 154 proposes to continue this discretion. 06
The Ontario Securities Commission has recognized fortunately that the
disclosure of sales or gross operating revenue is important in placing investors
on an equal footing in the market place and has accordingly exercised its
discretion sparingly, noting recently that "the cases in which there is likely
to be sufficient evidence to demonstrate 'undue detriment' will be rare."10 7
99 Id., at para. 9.36.

100 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32, as amended by S.C. 1969-70, c. 70, s. 122.1. The Canada
CorporationsAct does not, however, contain minimum percentages of gross revenue that
must be contributed by a class of business before requiring disclosure.
101 The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 426; am. S.O. 1971, c. 31 (herein cited as the
"Ontario Securities Act"), s. 126(3)16; and The Business CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1970,
c. 53; am. S.O. 1971, c. 26 and c. 98, s. 178(3)18.
102 See text relating to note 86 supra.
103 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 9.35.
104 Note 28 supra.

105 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 132(1)(a)(ii).
106 Bill 154, s. 102(1)(a)(hi).
107
In The Matter Of The Niagara Wire Weaving Company Limited, Bulletin of the
Ontario Securities Commission (November, 1971) 178 at 188.
In connection with this matter generally, see also, Re Niagara Wire Weaving Co.
Ltd., [1971] 3 O.R. 633 (C.A.); In The Matter Of The Niagara Wire Weaving Company
Limited (No. 2), [19721 3 O.R. 129 (C.A.); and In The Matter of Zenith Electric Supply
Limited, Bulletin of the Ontario Securities Commission (January, 1972) 13.
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IV. SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS, THE WHEAT REPORT
AND RULE 144
Secondary Distributions
Although it has only been referred to in a peripheral way, one of the
major problems that has faced and still faces investors, securities administrators, securities lawyers, brokers and investment banking firms is the secondary distribution problem. In this article a secondary distribution means
a resale of securities to the public by purchasers who acquired such securities
either by the use of some exemption from the registration or prospectus
requirements of the applicable securities laws or by means of an essentially
"non-public" or private offering and sale, neither of which required a prospectus standard of disclosure to be made available to the public generally
relating to the issuer or the securities involved. The specific statutory framework within which the secondary distribution problem arises is different under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Ontario Securities Act, as it was at the
date of the Merger Report. 08 However, the problem faced in Canada and
the United States is substantially similar: the ultimate distribution of securities
to the public through the use of essentially "non-public" offering and sale
exemptions from the registration or prospectus requirements of the Acts
without adequate and timely disclosure to the public generally in respect of
the issuer and the securities so distributed.
In the United States, the Wheat Report found that there was general
uncertainty, inherent ambiguity and wide divergence of practice involved in
the determinations whether a purchaser was an "underwriter", as defined in
section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, or whether a sale was exempt
from the registration statement requirements on the ground that the offering
was not a "public offering" under section 4(2). In addition, the intricate
and subjective doctrines of "investment intent" and "change of circumstances"
and the concept of fungibility' 0 9 had operated to create an interwoven web
of legal logic that had permitted, because of a lack of objective standards, an
108 It is not necessary to repeat here the respective frameworks of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Ontario Securities Act within which the secondary distribution problem
operates. These have been adequately set out elsewhere. See, in connection with the United
States aspects, I Loss, supra, note 6 at 182-183, Ch. 3A(3) and Ch. 3C; W. McNeil
Kennedy, The Case of the ScarletLetter or The Easy Out of "PrivateOfferings" (1967), 23
The Business Lawyer 23; Carlos L. Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of PrivatePlacement (1959), 45 Virginia L. Rev. 851; Gary L. Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in
Secondary Transactions(1964), 39 New York University Law Review 1043 and the Wheat
Report, supra, note 1 at 152-182. The sole useful comment on the Canadian aspect is contained in the Merger Report, supra, note 5,Chs. II, IV and V.
109 As to the concept of fungibility, see, Fungibility (1971), 4 The Review of Securities
Regulation 905; and Jack I. Samet, The Concept of Fungibility in Securities Laws (1972),
27 The Business Lawyer 383.
A form of fungibility is recognized in Canadian securities law in connection with
distributions to the public from a control position. Under s. 1(1)6a(ii) of the Ontario
Securities Act, supra,note 101, once securities form part of a control position, they become
"restricted" even if they had been "previously distributed to the public." This concept will
continue under Bill 154 notwithstanding the deletion of the words "to the public": Bill 154,

s.l(1)lO(ii).
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avoidance of the statutory purpose of the securities statutes by non-functional
exemptions bearing no relation to the needs of the ultimate public investors
for adequate disclosure. As noted by the Wheat Report, the use of the
private offering exemption permitting the eventual distribution of securities to
the public by the "investment letter" and "change of circumstances" doctrines
is of little practical value in furthering the policy of securities legislation to
provide disclosure to the investing public when it needs it.11° Accordingly,
"the existence of vague and imprecise standards ... [relating to the private
placement provisions of the Securities Act of 1933] have operated through
the years to sanction the sale in interstate commerce of large quantities of
securities originally issued in non-public transactions. Such sales have occurred
and are occurring irrespective of the availability or non-availability of information concerning the issuers of the securities.""'
A similar concern about the adequacy of disclosure of material facts
to the secondary market for the benefit of the investing public who bought
from vendors who acquired their securities in essentially "non-public" transactions was reflected in the Merger Report: "The facts raised serious question
as to whether these exemptions [sections 19(1)3 and 19(3) of the Ontario
Securities Act] were intended to permit the ultimate distribution of quantities
of securities to the general public involving many millions of dollars. ... the
present law [1970] imposes no meaningful restriction on the right to resell
the securities into the market place but permits resales without the benefit of
a prospectus standard of disclosure and without the rights and obligations
which flow if such disclosure is deficient ....112
Wheat Report

In answering the problem, the Wheat Report, as the Merger Report
was to do subsequently, adopted the test enunciated by Mr. Justice Clark
in the Supreme Court of the United States and focused on ".

.

. the need of

'u
the offerees for the protections afforded by registration [a prospectus]. "13
The solution proposed by the Wheat Report to the consequences of the
secondary distribution problem in the United States was to integrate and
co-ordinate the expanded continuing disclosure requirements recommended
for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 referred to above with the disclosure
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and to differentiate between "reporting companies" and "non-reporting companies". In summary, the Wheat
Report proposed that limited secondary distributions without registration of
privately placed securities of "reporting companies" be permitted while

11o Wheat Report, supra, note 1, Ch. VI. "The lack of objective tests to determine
when and how shares issued in a non-public transaction may be offered publicly provides
an unfortunate leeway for the unscrupulous. It has been the Commission's experience
that unprincipled counsel will often give opinions on the availability of exemption from
registration when careful or responsible counsel would not do so." Id. at 177.
111 Id.at 174-75.
112 Supra, note 5, at para. 5.04.
113 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1952) at 127. See, the Wheat Report,

supra, note 1 at 19. The Merger Report said that it "applied this 'need to know' test throughout our consideration": supra,note 5 at para. 1.26.
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secondary distributions without registration of privately placed securities of
"non-reporting companies" be restricted for the substantial period of 5
years.1 14 The proposed rules would have replaced the existing uncertainty
and divergence of subjective determinations with the more finite guidelines
of objective tests while at the same time strengthening the position of the
ultimate public investor for full disclosure relating to the securities traded
in the open markets. The conclusions of the Wheat Report and its recommendations were stated as follows :115
It was concluded that a sensible answer to this question could only be found by
drawing a distinction between companies which filed regular reports on their affairs
with the [Securities and Exchange] Commission ... (so-called "reporting companies")
and companies which do not. If there has been no full disclosure of a company's
business, earnings and financial condition (or if, despite the fact that the company is
a reporting company, its reports appear to be defective or out of date), then a sale to
the public of that company's securities ought to be accompanied by the disclosures
afforded by '33 Act registration. Conversely, if a company has registered a class of
its securities with the Commission under the '34 Act and is maintaining the currency of the information in that original registration statement through up-to-date
periodic reports to the Commission, then it ought to be possible to permit secondary sales of its securities to the public without the filing of a '33 Act registration
statement except (i) where the quantity of those securities to be sold exceeds an
amount which the trading market could normally be expected to absorb within a
reasonable period of time, or (ii) where, in order to move the securities from
private into public hands, arrangements for the solicitation of buying customers,
or selling incentives exceeding the commissions paid in ordinary trading transactions, are required.
In other words, the exemptions from '33 Act registration should be interpreted not
only in light of the selling effort which can reasonably be anticipated but also in light
of the character and extent of the disclosures already made by the issuer of the
securities.

The recommendations made by the Wheat Report based on the differentiation of "reporting companies" and "non-reporting companies" may be
divided into two further areas: firstly, a definition of "distribution", or public
offering, to apply both to the sale of securities on behalf of controlling persons
and to sales by persons who have purchased their securities in private
offerings and, secondly, the term "restricted security". The Wheat Report
recommended that non-public secondary transactions should be excluded
from the term "distribution" and that no registration of the securities involved
be required; that public secondary offerings of securities of "non-reporting
companies" should be a "distribution" requiring registration; and that public
secondary offerings of securities of "reporting companies" that are not delinquent in their filings are not a "distribution" and no registration of the
securities is required if the amounts involved and the method of sale are consistent with ordinary trading. 116
Notwithstanding the concept of a "reporting company" and the continuous disclosure that would be made available on a timely basis concerning
114 Under the rules proposed by the Wheat Report, a privately placed or "restricted
security" would lose that status after a period of 5 years provided that the issuer is an
active, going business during that period: Wheat Report, supra, note I at 203. See text
in connection with note 120 inIra.
115 Wheat Report, supra, note 1 at 186-87.
116 Id. at 189-90.
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its affairs, the Wheat Report was of the view that resale of privately placed
securities of reporting companies must continue to be controlled. "The use
of ostensible private purchasers as conduits for the sale of securities to the
public without registration must be prevented. To solve this problem, a short
mandatory holding period is essential, during which the private purchaser is
'

at risk. "117

Accordingly, the Wheat Report recommended that a private purchaser
of securities from a "reporting company", or from a person in a control
position with such an issuer, be required to hold the securities for a period of
one year. The Wheat Report said that all who were consulted with respect to
this matter recognized the need for such a holding period but views as to its
appropriate length differed appreciably from a period of six months to a
period of two years. Such a mandatory one year holding period would continue to apply to a purchaser from an initial private purchaser in a subsequent
private resale. 18 In addition, there would be a quantity limitation on the
right of the private purchaser of securities of the "reporting company" to
resell such securities after the one year holding period to amounts consistent
with ordinary trading. In this regard the Wheat Report recommended preservation of the existing test set out in Rule 154. that such resales be limited
to sales, which together with all other sales of securities of the same class
by the same person within the preceding six months will not exceed 1% of
the outstanding securities of that class and, with respect to listed securities,
the lesser of either 1% of the outstanding securities of that class or the aggregate reported volume of trading during any one week within the preceding
four calendar weeks. 119
The term "restricted security" would mean a security acquired directly
or indirectly from the issuer, whether "reporting" or "non-reporting", or
from a person in a control relationship with the issuer, in a transaction or a
chain of transactions, none of which was a public offering or a public disposition. Accordingly, securities purchased privately either from the issuer
or a control person and subsequently disposed of privately would remain
"restricted securities". However, once such securities are resold in a public
offering, they would cease to be "restricted securities". 120
From the foregoing summary of the proposals of the Wheat Report in
the area of secondary distributions, the following practical consequences
would result:
(i) A controlling person of a "non-reporting company" would not be
able to sell his securities to the public without registration;
1

17 Id. at 199.
118 Id. at 200. It is interesting to note that with respect to the length of the holding
period, in basically analogous recommendations, the Merger Report settled on only a 28
day mandatory holding period prior to public resale without filing a prospectus. See text
relating to notes 180 and 191 infra.
1191d. at 190-91.
120 Id. at 202-203. See note 114, supra. The concept of the "restricted security" is
similar to the present concept in the Ontario Securities Act of securities "not previously
distributed to the public", the sale of which securities to the public constitutes a distribution
requiring a prospectus: Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 1(1)6a(i).
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(ii) A controlling person of a "reporting company" who had acquired
his securities in a public distribution, that is to say, non-restricted securities,
would not be subject to the one year holding period and would be entitled to
sell his shares to the public under existing rules in limited quantities during
any one six-month period in brokerage transactions where no more than the
minimum commission was charged;
(iii) A non-controlling person holding "restricted securities" of a
"non-reporting company" would be in the same position as a controlling
person of a "non-reporting company" (item (i) above); and
(iv) A holder of "restricted securities" in a "reporting company",
including a controlling person, would be required to hold such "restricted
securities" for a period of one year and then could only sell such "restricted
securities" to the public in ordinary brokerage transactions
involving a limited
121
quantity of securities in any one six-month period.
The Wheat Report itself estimated that the objectivity of its proposals
would have made 90% of the 500 written requests for "no action" letters
the Securities and Exchange Commission received in November and December, 1968 unnecessary. 12
The Wheat Report stressed that its proposals summarized above were
grounded on and assumed the operation of the expanded and continuous
disclosure system for "reporting companies" subject to the filing requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As summarized by the Wheat
Report: 123
The central policy embodied in the proposed rules is that public resales without
registration [of securities sold in private offerings] under the '33 Act should be
confined to the securities of those companies which are filing information with
the [Securities and Exchange] Commission adequate to keep the trading markets
reasonably well informed and immediately available to all interested investors and
their advisors through the Commission's microfiche system.

The continuous disclosure system and the rules to deal with the problem
of secondary distributions proposed by the Wheat Report were favourably
received and approved by the United States securities bar.IU The Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association unanimously praised the Wheat Report. Its recommendations were commended by
the Council of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of
the American Bar Association and the House of Delegates of the American
121 Id. at
122 Id. at

226-3 1. Cf. the proposals of the Merger Report and Bill 154, note 191 infra.
175. For an analysis of the "no action" letter practice, see, Lewis D. Lowen-

fels, SEC "No Action" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches (1971), 71

Columbia Law Rev.1256.
12

3 Id. at 207.
124 See, Hugh L. Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of FederalSecurities Regulation (1970), 23 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 495 and Herbert S. Wander, Secondary Distribu-

tions (1969), 2 The Review of Securities Regulation 865 at 869: "There is already widespread agreement that they [the Wheat Report proposals] represent a significant and
urgently needed improvement over the existing structure. They should be adopted promptly
and, if experience dictates, modified accordingly."
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Bar Association, and the Securities and Exchange Commission was urged to
implement its essential recommendations.125
On September 15, 1969, the Securities and Exchange Commission
announced that it proposed to adopt the major recommendations of the
Wheat Report without substantial change by implementing the "160 Series"
of proposed rules relating to secondary distributions proposed by the Wheat
Report. 126 The Release stated that the purpose of the proposed rules was
"to inhibit the creation of public markets in securities of issuers which do not
disclose information to the public in appropriate filings with the Commission"
and that such proposals were vitally related to and dependent on the expanded
reporting requirements simultaneously proposed. 127 The rules proposed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission were stated to "mark a major advance
in the administration of the Securities Act. ' 1 28
Rule 144
The major non-development during 1970 in United States securities
law was, however, the decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission
not to adopt the "160 Series" of proposed rules recommended by the
Wheat Report.129 Instead, a year after its original recommendation of the
Wheat Report proposals, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed
a new Rule 144 dealing with unregistered secondary distributions by controlling persons and by persons who purchase securities in private transactions. 130 Rule 144 as originally proposed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission continued the essential condition that permissable resales of
"restricted securities" be irrevocably linked to publicly available and reasonably current and informative information about the issuer of the securities.
However, Rule 144 as originally proposed not only differed in various ways
from the complex though clearly stated Wheat Report proposals 131 but "met
25Allen E. Throop, FederalRegulation of Securities Committee Comments on The
Wheat Report (1969), 25 The Business Lawyer 39; The Wheat Report - Time is Running
Out (1970), 25 The Business Lawyer 1267.
126 Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4997. See, Herbert S. Wander, Implementing
The Wheat Report (1969), 2 The Review of Securities Regulation 821 and The SEC's

Disclosure Proposals (1969), 2 The Review of Securities Regulation 798 at 801; "The
proposed [SEC] rules and forms make good sense. If adopted they will provide more
meaningful information for investors and abolish much of the nonsensical black magic
that has prevailed in the securities community for too long."
127 Id. at 1. See, note 88 supra.
128 A. Holland, Public Sale of ControlStock and Private Investment Stock: The SEC's
ProposedNew Rules (1970), 25 The Business Lawyer 1027 at 1036.
129 See, Daniel B. Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation (1970), 25
The Business Lawyer 1643 at 1682.
130 Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5087 (September 22, 1970).
131 For an analysis of the Wheat Report proposals and Rule 144 as originally proposed,
see, Michael J.Halloran, The Public Dispositionof RestrictedSecurities and of Securities
Held By Controlling Persons - The Wheat Report, SEC Proposed Rule 144 and The
Search for Certainty (1971), 45 St. John's Law Rev. 665 and Glen W. Clark, SEC Regulation of Resale of Securities by ControllingPersons of Non-Reporting Issuers: The Ghost
of Ira Haupt Reads the "Wheat Report" and Rule 144 (1971), 20 Drake Law Rev. 576.
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with wholesale opposition from almost all sectors of the Securities Bar." 132
Almost a year later and two years after its first proposals recommending the
implementation of the Wheat Report proposals, the Securities and Exchange
Commission published a revised draft of proposed Rule 144133 which met the
main criticisms of the first draft. Revised Rule 144 returned to the basic
framework of the Wheat Report proposals with minor variations and some
changed numbers. While being somewhat more restrictive, revised Rule 144
adhered to the tenet that "restricted securities" should not become "freely
salable without adequate disclosure to investors at the time of sale" through
continuous filing of updated business and financial information by "reporting
companies". 134 Within several months, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a further revision of Rule 144 which became effective on April
15, 1972.135
Generally, Rule 144 as finally adopted incorporated the basic structure
of the Wheat Report proposals as summarized above, including the quantity
restrictions on the number of restricted securities that may be sold during any
six month period. Under Rule 144 a person, including a controlling person of
the issuer, that has been the beneficial owner of "restricted securities" of a
"reporting company" for at least two years may sell in ordinary broker's
transactions, not involving the solicitation of purchasers or the payment of
more than the customary brokerage commission, during any six month period,
(a) where the securities are listed, an amount equal to the lesser of 1% of
outstanding securities of that class or the average weekly reported volume of
trading on all exchanges over the four-week period prior to the date of the
filing of a notice of sale with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or (b)
where the securities are not traded on an exchange, an amount equal to 1%
of the outstanding securities of that class. In calculating the amount of
"restricted securities" that may be sold by such a person during any six
month period, there must be included sales by any relative or spouse of
such person that has the same home as such person, any trust or estate in
which such person and such relatives and spouse, collectively, own 10% or
more of the beneficial interest and any corporation or organization in which
such person and such relatives and spouse, collectively, own beneficially 10%
or more of any class of equity securities. 136
In addition, Rule 144 increased the mandatory holding period for the
non-public purchaser from the one year recommended by the Wheat Report
to two years before permitting limited resale of "restricted securities" of
132 Daniel B. Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation (1971), 26 The
Business Lawyer 1677 at 1682. See also, Herbert S. Wander, ProposedRule 144 (1970), 3
The Review of Securities Regulation 843, The SEC Under Fire (1970), 3 The Review of
Securities Regulation 829, and William C. Morrow, The Investment Letter Dilemma and
ProposedRule 144: A Retreat to Confusion (1970), 11 Santa Clara Lawyer 37.
133 Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5187 (September 15, 1971).
134See, Herbert S. Wander, Rule 144 Revised (1971), 4 The Review of Securities
Regulation 857 and PLI Securities Law Institute - 1 (1971), 4 The Review of Securities
Regulation 824.
135 Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5223 (January 11, 1972).
136 Rule 144, (e)(2) and (a)(2). Cf. Wheat Report proposals at'note 121 supra.
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"reporting companies". The two year holding period as a condition for public
resale without registration by purchasers, including controlling persons, of
"restricted securities" of "reporting companies" may be considered excessive,
but evidently the Securities and Exchange Commission seemed "convinced
that a lengthy holding period during which the private placee accepts an
unconditional economic risk is essential to prevent [reporting] issuers from
making unregistered sales through conduits who would purchase privately
and, shortly thereafter, resell publicly."' 137 In addition, the vendor is required
to file a brief notice of sale with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
have a bona fide intent to sell after the filing thereof. If all the securities are
not sold within 90 days after such filing, an amended notice of sale must be
filed when sales are recommenced. The burden will be on the vendor to prove
the availability of the exemption and he must also represent that he does not
know of any non-public materially adverse information about the current or
prospective operations of the issuer. 138 "The rule carefully balances the needs
of controlling persons and holders of restricted securities for certainty with
the needs of investors for information at the time they purchase. As was true
with prior drafts, the balance is still in favour of investor protection .... -139
V.

SECONDARY DISTRIBUTIONS, THE MERGER REPORT
AND BILL 154

Genesis of the Merger Report
The Wheat Report was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission in March, 1969 and publicly released by the SEC without comment
the following month. In April, 1969, the Ontario Securities Commission was
requested by the Ontario Government to undertake a study of, among other
things, private placements and exempt purchasers. The resulting study of the
Ontario Securities Commission, the Merger Report, was submitted in February, 1970. The Merger Report was prompted, in part, by the secondary
distribution problem outlined at the beginning of Part IV, the tremendous
increase in business acquisitions and take-overs and "the potential for abuse
through public distribution of securities in the guise of private or exempt
placements."14 It is probably the most comprehensive and relevant public
analysis of Canadian securities legislation to date. In view of the similarity
of problems, the experience available from and the proximity of the American
137 Herbert S. Wander, Rule 144 Adopted (1972), 5 The Review of Securities Regulation 957 at 958.
See also, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5223 (January 11, 1972) at 6:
"Secondly, a holding period prior to resale is essential, among other things, to assure that
those persons who buy under a claim of a Section 4(2) exemption have assumed the
economic risks of investment, and therefore, are not acting as conduits for sale to the
public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer."
138 Id. at 960.
139 Id. at 963. See, Stephen R. Miller and Richard S. Seltzer, The SEC's New Rule 144

(1972), 27 The Business Lawyer 1047 and Harold P. Starr, Suggested Rule 144 Checklist

(1972), 27 The Business Lawyer 1073.
140 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at 1.
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securities markets, it is not surprising that the thrust of the recommendations
of the Merger Report is basically similar to that contained in the Wheat
Report. While it is clear that there has not been any conscious parallelism,
the similarity of fundamental concepts indicates that Canadian securities
problems and their solutions have progressed along patterns similar to those
14
experienced in the United States. '
The Merger Report also based its proposals to solve the secondary
distribution problem upon the creation of two classes of companies for
securities purposes: "reporting companies" and "non-reporting companies".
Generally a "reporting company" would be one that filed a "cornerstone
prospectus" with the Ontario Securities Commission containing "full, true
and plain disclosure" of all material facts relating to the affairs of the company
and that subsequently continued to maintain such a prospectus-standard of
disclosure by publicly up-dating its material corporate information through
filing quarterly unaudited financial reports, timely amendments relating to
changes in material facts previously disclosed and annual statements incorporating and up-dating on one document the prior changes and containing
audited financial statements. 142 The Merger Report recommended that companies presently required to report under Parts X and XII of the Ontario
Securities Act be considered "reporting companies" as well as all companies
whose securities become listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange or whose
securities are distributed in Ontario by a prospectus in the future. 143 A further
distribution of treasury securities to the public by a "reporting company"
would be effected by filing a short form prospectus or offering circular disclosing "salient facts" about the company and the purpose of the issue. It
would contain the appropriate certificates of the issuer and the underwriter
and be subject to review and acceptance by the Ontario Securities Commission.144
"Reporting Issuer" Under Bill 154
Following the Merger Report recommendations, Bill 154 purposes that
companies or "issuers '' 145 may become "reporting issuers"1 46 by filing a pre141 See, Manuel F. Cohen, InternationalSecurities Markets: Their Regulation (1971),
46 St. John's Law Review 264 at 266: "Securities regulation in every country is, of course,
a reflection of national experience and needs."
142 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at paras. 2.21 and 2.22.
143 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.35. As noted earlier, supra, note 74, it was
recommended that the distinction between distributing "equity shares" and other types
of securities be abandoned. This recommendation is adopted in Bill 154.

144 Id. at para. 2.28.
14

5 An issuer includes a "person" or company that has outstanding, issues or proposed
to issue a security: Bill 154, s. 1(1)15. "Person" includes all types of unincorporated
associations: s. 1(1)21.
146 Bill 154, s. 1(1)29.
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liminary cornerstone statement 147 and cornerstone statement with the Ontario
Securities Commission and obtaining receipts therefor.' 48 Companies that are
now subject to the proxy solicitation and financial disclosures requirements of
the Ontario Securities Act are not automatically entitled to the status of
reporting issuers under Bill 154 and the resultant privileges flowing from that
status. The status is statutorily permissive, upon satisfying certain conditions,
and is attained by having a final receipt issued by the Ontario Securities
Commission for the filing of a cornerstone statement. However, in view of
the real limitations imposed by Bill 154 by not being a reporting issuer, al
issuers with securities distributed to or to be distributed to the public will be
required to become and maintain their status as reporting issuers.
As noted earlier, 149 not every issuer may be able to become a reporting
issuer under Bill 154. If an issuer "does not meet such financial requirements
and conditions as are specified in the regulations", then the Director will be
required to refuse the issuance of a receipt for the cornerstone statement. 150 This
is a surprising extension of the function of the Ontario Securities Commission
and goes far beyond the regulation of the distribution of securities to the
public by the application of a full disclosure policy. Such a "blue sky" regulation would be in addition to the residual discretion of the Ontario Securities
Commission presently contained in section 61 of the Ontario Securities Act
and to be continued by Bill 154.151 Technically, the Director could exercise
his residual discretion and refuse to issue a receipt for a cornerstone statement
even though the issuer satisfied the requisite "financial requirements and
conditions". It is anticipated that this would happen only in extreme and
unique situations. The importance of this addition is in direct relation to the
benefits of being a reporting issuer under Bill 154: only reporting issuers
are to be entitled to distribute securities to the public in the normal manner
through an offering circular and only purchasers of securities of reporting
issuers acquired pursuant to the main distribution exemptions will be freely
entitled to resell such securities. 152 In other words, it is proposed by Bill 154
that those issuers that cannot meet "such financial requirements and conditions" will not be able to use the normal methods of financing.
Under Bill 154, a reporting issuer must file a new cornerstone statement
within 170 days from the end of its last completed financial year consolidating and up-dating all material facts relating to its affairs. It would appear
147 While the "preliminary cornerstone statement" must comply with the regulations
in form and content (s. 60) and a receipt is issued for its filing (s. 61), it appears to serve
no functional purpose other than as a draft of the cornerstone statement, open to public
inspection (s. 68), presumably even if a cornerstone statement is not finally accepted for
filing. The preliminary offering circular however, continues the real function of the
preliminary prospectus by permitting the solicitation of expressions of interest during the
waiting period: s. 72(2).
148 Bill 154, s. 59. The form and content of a cornerstone prospectus win be set forth
in the regulations: s. 62(1)(b).
149 See text relating to note 54 supra.
150 Bill 154, s. 64(1)(b).
151 Id. s. 64(1) with respect to cornerstone statements and s. 80(1) with respect to
offering circulars.
152 Id. s. 69(a), s. 93(3) and s. 93(4). See notes 159 and 191 infra.
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that the new cornerstone statement is not subject to review by the Ontario
Securities Commission in the same manner as the original cornerstone statement and is simply filed annually.153 Once the status of a reporting issuer is
achieved, it must be continued and presumably compliance and cease trading
orders would issue upon failure to file new cornerstone statements pursuant
to the statutory requirement. 154 Bill 154 does not grant authority to the
Ontario Securities Commission to exempt a reporting issuer from this provision
if the laws of the jurisdiction to which it is subject contain substantially
similar requirements and on condition that material so filed, such as a Form
10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 155 is filed with the
Ontario Securities Commission as the new cornerstone statement. 156
Separate and distinct from its obligations to refile a current cornerstone
statement annually, a reporting issuer will be required to file annual audited
comparative financial statements within 170 days from the end of its latest
completed financial year and quarterly unaudited comparative interim financial
statements within 30 days from the end of each quarter, including the fourth
quarter. 157
Distributionsto the Public
The basic concept of the "reporting company" or "reporting issuer" is
easily understandable. It is the consequences recommended by the Merger
153 Id. s. 67. Cf. s. 91 of Bill 154 relating to filing a new offering circular where
distribution is still in progress 12 months from the filing of the preliminary offering
circular.
Presumably the disclosures contained in the new cornerstone statement would
come under review when an offering circular was filed.
In addition, in order to be assured of the co-ordination of the continuing disclosure
system, the Ontario Securities Commission may require evidence at the time of filing an
offering circular that the reporting issuer has complied on a timely basis with all the
reporting requirements of Bill 154. See, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5196 (September
27, 1971).
154 Id. see s. 145 and s. 146. See, Ontario Securities Commission Policy No. 3-14. In
SEC v. Realty Equities Corp., CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. #93,545 (D.C. 1972), a permanent
injunction was granted against the defendant corporation which had been delinquent in
filing periodic reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from failing subsequently to file such reports on time.
155 See text relating to note 88 supra.
1560 Cf., s. 132(1) (c) (ii) of the Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101 and s.
102(1)(c)(ii) of Bill 154.
In addition, the Ontario Securities Commission should have jurisdiction, similar
to that of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to relax the reporting requirements
of Bill 154 where a reporting issuer's operations and activities have ceased or are severely
curtailed and where such a reporting issuer advises its shareholders of its financial condition
and inability to provide the required information: Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 9660 (June 30, 1972).
157 Bill 154, s. 98 and s. 100. Corporations that are not reporting issuers but that have
outstanding securities (not just equity shares) in respect of which a prospectus, statement
of material facts or securities take-over bid circular has been filed with the Ontario Securities Commission or whose shares are listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange will be required to file the annual audited comparative financial statements but will file semi-annual
unaudited comparative financial statements instead of the quarterly unaudited financial
statements: see, s. 96(1)(b) and s. 99 of Bill 154.

1972]

Securities Disclosure

Report and proposed to be implemented by Bill 154 that are to flow from an
issuer being a "reporting issuer" or a "non-reporting issuer" that are important. The heart of the Merger Report is its analysis of and recommendations
relating to the secondary distribution problem and to the benefits derived
from the use of the exemptions to the prospectus requirements of the Ontario
Securities Act for reporting issuers and non-reporting issuers. As a basis for
its proposals to solve the secondary distribution problem, the Merger Report
recommended that the concept of a sale "to the public" be discarded on the
premise that the legislation intends to protect everyone. The Merger Report
proposed that the term "distribution to the public" be re-defined as a
"distribution" as follows :158
i. trades that are made for the purpose of distributingsecurities of a company not
previously issued, or
ii. trades in previously issued securities where the securities form all or a part of or
are derived from the holdings of any person, company or any combination of
persons or companies holding a sufficient number of any of the securities of a
company to materially affect the control of such company, provided that any
person, company or any combination of persons or companies holding more than
20% of the outstanding equity shares in a company shall, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, be deemed to materially affect the control of such company....
(emphasis added)

Accordingly, giving effect to such proposed amendment, section 69 of Bill
154, the proposed successor to section 35 of the Ontario Securities Act,
provides that "no person or company shall trade in a security... where such
trade would be in the course of distribution of such security.. ." unless the
issuer is a reporting issuer and a preliminary offering circular and offering

15 9
circular have been accepted for filing by the Ontario Securities Commission.
The Merger Report was of the view that the fundamental purpose of
the Ontario Securities Act is to be exhaustive and all-inclusive and to protect
"virtually everyone excepting those that it specifically exempted from its
158 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 3.21 and para. 4.14. The substance of this
recommendation is incorporated in s. 1(1)10 of Bill 154.
In para. 8.01, the Merger Report stated that "in Chapter M we consider the
concept of 'public' in the light of the present legislation, concluding in paragraphs 3.20
and 3.21 that the inclusion of the word 'public' in the definition of 'distribution' was
redundant. This conclusion is based on the premise that the legislation intends to protect
everyone."
159 An issuer may become a "reporting issuer" under Division A of Part XIII of Bill
154 simply for the purpose of attaining that status and the benefits that flow therefrom.
One of the main benefits under Bill 154 is, however, that being a reporting issuer is a
condition precedent to being entitled to distribute securities to the public pursuant to an
offering circular under Division B of Part XIII. A company that proposes to distribute
securities to the public for the first time by a firm underwriting through an investment
dealer in the ordinary course must first become a reporting issuer. This does not appear to
have been a recommendation of the Merger Report: see, para. 3.24 (a) thereof. Bill 154
as tabled does not provide a desirable flexibility to a non-reporting issuer to make an
initial distribution of securities to the public pursuant to a prospectus-type document that
would be at the same time a cornerstone statement and an offering circular. Delay and
duplication of documentation and procedure may be avoided for non-reporting issuers
if the qualification of the cornerstone statement and the offering circular may be proceeded
with simultaneously and the initial offering circular contain virtually all the material set
forth in the cornerstone statement. On this basis the Director would be required to issue
a receipt for a preliminary offering circular before issuing a receipt for the (final) cornerstone statement.
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protective umbrella."1 60 If the purpose of the prospectus and disclosure
protection afforded by section 35 of the Ontario Securities Act is to embrace
"everyone", except those specifically exempted, then there is substantial
doubt that such purpose is achieved at the present time in view of the existing
definition of a "distribution to the public". As the Ontario Securities Act is
now drafted, a prospectus is not required unless there is a "distribution to the
public", which in turn by statutory definition only includes trades that are
made "to the public". 161 Accordingly, and relying on section 19(3) of the
Ontario Securities Act solely for an exemption from the registration prohibition of section 6, in appropriate circumstances a company could issue at
the present time treasury securities having an aggregate cost of at least
$97,000 to a single corporate purchaser by a purely private and non-public
trade and not come within the prohibition of section 35 and thereby not be
required to file a Form 11 under the regulations to the Ontario Securities
Act. 162 However, such securities, not being "previously distributed to the
public", 163 could not be resold under existing law "to the public" by such a
private purchaser without a prospectus, an appropriate exemption from the
prospectus requirements or a section 59 ruling. It would follow, however,
that the private purchaser could trade such non-publicly distributed or
"restricted" securities provided that that trade was similarly not "to the
public".
As noted by the Merger Report, 64 there has not been a satisfactory
judicial review of the concept of the "public" in Canada as that term is used
in relation to securities regulation. The existing Anglo-Canadian case law
does support, however, a distinction in law between a non-public or private
trade and a trade "to the public"' 65 and the view that "whether or not there
160 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at para. 3.14.
161 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 1(1)6a. Both parts of s. 1(1)6a only
apply to trades that are made for the purpose of distributing securities "to the public". By

contrast, the registration prohibition contained in s. 6(l)(a) of the Ontario Securities Act
is all-inclusive and applies to every trade in a security.
102 Ontario Regulation 794/70, as amended, s. 11.

163 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 1(1)6a(i).
104 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at paras. 3.10 to 3.14.
165 See, Nash v. Lynde, [1929] A.C. 158 (H.L.); Regina v. Empire Dock Limited
(1940), 55 B.C.R. 34 (Co. Ct.); Regina v. Piepgrass (1959), 23 D.LR. (2d) 220 (Alta.

C.A.); Regina v. Golden Shamrock Mines Ltd. et aL, [1965] 1. O.R. 692 (C.A.) and
Regina v. McKillop, [1972] 1. O.R. 164.

In addition, see a reasonably full discussion on the concept of the "public" in

David L. Johnston, Differences Between Companies With Public Securities Offerings and
Companies Without Public Securities Offerings (1970) at pp. C-23 to C-31 in Special

One-Day Programme, The Business Corporations Act, 1970, November, 1970, The Law
Society of Upper Canada.
See also, Lee v. Evans (1964), 112 C.L.R. 276 (H.C. of A.) en banc. Barwick C.J.
stated at 285-286: ".... the basic concept is that the invitation [to the public], though
maybe not universal, is general; that it is an invitation to all and sundry of some segment
of the community at large. This does not mean that it must be an invitation to all the
public either everywhere, or in any particular community. How large a section of the
public must be addressed in a general invitation for it to be an invitation to the public in
the relevant connexion must depend on the context of each particular enactment and the
circumstances of each case. But within that sufficient area of the community the invitation
must be general...".
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was an offering to the public is a finding of fact." 166 The jurisprudence in the
United States is clearer and recognizes trades "not involving any public
offering." Such trades are exempt and will continue to be exempt from the
registration statement or prospectus requirement of the Securities Act of
1933.167 The rationale of Rule 144, as noted earlier, is to set forth objective
rules pursuant to which a "distribution" is not considered to take place.
On the above analysis of the Ontario Securities Act, there exists the
genesis for the creation of a class of "restricted", lettered or non-publicly
distributed security that cannot be freely traded "to the public" without filing
a prospectus but which can be traded to and within a closed group of "nonpublic" purchasers. Accordingly, based on the premise that the word "public"
was redundant, "to clear away the confusion which now surrounds the concept of 'public'" and to avoid the concept of "letter stock", the Merger Report recommended that, except in section 19(2) of the Ontario Securities
Act, the word "public" be deleted. 168 In the view of the Merger Report, the
result of the deletion of the phrase "to the public" and the revised definition
of "distribution" set forth above would be that "every issue of a security by a
company and every trade in any security by a person defined in branch ii of
'distribution' would be a 'distribution' subject to prospectus disclosure (if the
company is not a reporting company) or offering circular disclosure (if the
company is a reporting company) by section 35 [of the Ontario Securities
Act] unless a specified exemption from such disclosure is available in section
58(1), or pursuant to a section 59 order."' 169 (emphasis added)
It appears clear that the Merger Report would interpret the verb
"distribute" as contained in section 1(1)10(i) of Bill 154 as synonymous
with "issue" on the premise that the legislation intends to protect everyone.
This premise that the Ontario Securities Act intends to protect everyone is
legally doubtful. Even under proposed section 1(1)10(i) of Bill 154, a
"distribution" occurs only if there is a trade in securities not previously
issued "for the purpose of distributing" those treasury securities. Accordingly,
one questions whether a company can "issue" securities without "distributing"
them and thereby, in certain limited cases, not be engaged in a "distribution"
requiring an offering circular under section 69.170 If such is the case, and
assuming the appropriate registration exemption is available in section 38
of Bill 154, in appropriate circumstances a purchaser of treasury securities
that were "issued" but not "distributed" may not be restricted by the pro166 Hugh J.MacDonald J.A. in Regina v.Piepgrass (1959), 23 D.L.R. (2d) 220
(Alta. CA.) at 227. To the same effect, see Warrington J. in Sherwell v. Combined
Incandescent Mantles Syndicate Limited (1907), 23 Times Law Reports 482 at 483.
The Merger Report also recognized that all trades were not per se "to the public":
paras. 3.16 to 3.17 and 6.05 to 6.08.

167 Securities Act of 1933, supra,note 10, s. 4(2). See, I Loss, supra,note 6, Ch.3C,2(a).
168 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at para. 3.15.
169 Id. at para. 3.21(a).

170A similar question was asked during the period from 1947 to 1971 when the
various Securities Acts of Ontario defined a "primary distribution to the public" as including trades made "for the purpose of distributing to the public securities issued by
a company and not previously distributed." See, R.C. Meech, Q.C., Prospectusand RegistrationRequirements, in Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 1968 at 224.
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posed statutory definition of "distribution" from reselling such securities in
the public market unless he controlled or was part of the control group of
the issuer within section l(1)10(ii) of Bill 154. However, any such purchaser would have to safeguard against becoming a statutory "underwriter"1 71
and would have to satisfy any additional investment intent imposed by his
registration exemption 72. It would appear that the above line of reasoning
would negate the blanket prohibition sponsored by the Merger Report that
every issue of previously unissued securities required an offering circular,
an exemption or a ruling.
In section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, an "underwriter" is
defined as a "person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security. . .". The word "distribution" in s. 2(11) is not defined but is regarded by the Securities and Exchange Commission "as more or less synonymous with 'public offering'".173 Accordingly, under United States practice, a
purchaser of previously unissued securities is not an "underwriter" if he purchases such securities from an issuer with a view to investment. While this
view appears prima facie consistent with the remark of the Merger Report
that the inclusion of the word "public" in the definition of "distribution" is
redundant' 74 , there is a significant difference because the Merger Report's
view is that every issue is per se a trade to the public and thereby a "distribution!'.
Use of Exemptions
Assuming, however, the implementation of the changes proposed by the
Merger Report and Bill 154, and the real prohibition against distributing
previously unissued securities without an offering circular, the Merger Report
and Bill 154 contemplate a consistent and interwoven framework to solve the
secondary distribution problem based upon the concepts of "reporting issuers"
and continuous disclosure. As referred to earlier, the secondary distribution
problem is, quite properly, of great concern to the Merger Report. While
always cognizant of the problems of liquidity in the Canadian equity market
and not wishing to place further restrictions on it, the Merger Report noted,
however, that the use of the present sections 19(1)3 and 19(3) of the
Ontario Securities Act to avoid the prospectus requirements of the Act
raised the possibility that exempt persons may be used as conduits for
distributing securities to the public.' 75 This result may ensue at the present
171 "Underwriter" is defined in s. 1(1)35 of Bill 154 as a person or company who
purchases securities "with a view to, or who as agent for an issuer offers for sale or sells
securities in connection with, a distribution of such securities .. "'.To avoid becoming an
"underwriter" and to avoid a "distribution" of previously unissued securities on the initial

trade by the issuer, a purchaser would have to purchase such securities for investment
and not with a view to distribution. This approach would incorporate the United States
experience of "lettered stock". See note 108 supra.
172 See, for example, Bill 154, s. 38(1)3, s. 38(1)11 and s. 38(3).
1731 Loss, supra,note 6, at 551.
174 See note 158 supra.
175 Merger Report, supra,note 5, at para. 3.10.
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'time because, subject to satisfying its original investment intent, 176 an institution, exempt or private purchaser of securities under section 19(1)3 or
section 19(3) is, in normal circumstances and subject to not being a member
of the control group, freely entitled to resell securities purchased under those
exemptions into the secondary public market without any information being
made available to the public investor about the issuer or its affairs at the
time of resale. The Merger Report viewed securities acquired under these
exemptions in usual circumstances as having been "previously distributed to
the public" 177 and, accordingly, freely available for resale. 178
The Merger Report recommended that the right to use the sections 19 (1) 3
and 19(3) prospectus exemptions be conditioned upon the issuer being a
"reporting company", upon a timely amendment disclosing the details and
purpose of the issue being filed with the Ontario Securities Commission
within ten days of the receipt of the subscription and upon the filing of Form
11 signed by the purchaser. 179 In addition, such institutions, exempt and
private purchasers would not be entitled to resell any securities so purchased
without filing an offering circular unless the issuer was, presumably at the time
of resale, a "reporting company", there were no special sales efforts relating
to such resales and such purchaser held the securities for a minimum period
of 28 days from the filing of the timely amendment. 8 0 If the issuer is a
"reporting company", presumably both at the time of sale and at least 28
days after the purchase, then, subject to satisfying his original investment
intent and not being categorized as an "underwriter", the purchaser under
sections 19(1)3 or 19(3) would then be free to resell.' 8 '
176 Assuming that there is a "distribution to the public", the section 19(1)3 or section
19(3) exemptions from the prospectus requirements of section 35 of the Ontario Securities
Act, supra, note 101, are available only where the purchaser purchases as principal "for
investment only and not with a view to resale or distribution": section 58(1)(a), 58(1)(b)
and 19(3) of the Ontario Securities Act. The "investment intent" required under these
sections and as certified by the purchaser in his Form 11 filed with the Ontario Securities
Commission has not been analyzed as in the United States; see, I Loss, supra, note 6,

Ch. 3C, 2(b).
The Toronto Stock Exchange has not set a fixed period of time during which
section 19(1)3 or section 19(3) purchasers of securities of listed companies must hold in

order to establish investment intent. However, where the proposed purchaser's investment
practice is not well known to the Exchange, the Exchange will require that the securities be

held in escrow by a financial institution for a six month period. See, The Toronto Stock
Exchange Members' Manual, Division G, Part II.

177 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 1(1)6a(i). As noted earlier, supra, note
162, a trade to a purchaser referred to in s. 19(1)3 or s. 19(3) may not per se be a trade

"to the public".
178 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 3.18 and para. 5.18.
179Id. at para. 5.23(1)(a). Para. 5.25(1) and (2) appear inconsistent with para. 5.23(1)
whether a non-reporting issuer would be entitled to use the s. 19(1)3 and s. 19(3) prospectus
exemptions.

180 In para. 5.23(3) the Merger Report indicated that the timely amendment would be
"approved by the board, signed and certified and filed immediately following closing."
Accordingly, the exempt purchaser would be required to hold, on this basis, for a minimum
statutory period of 28 days.
181 Id. at para. 5.25. See also para. 3.21(b) where it is indicated that this result would
be achieved by deeming a trade in a security purchased pursuant to the above exemptions
as a "distribution" unless the conditions referred to above were satisfied.
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The philosophy of permitting such prima facie freedom is based on the
fact that under the proposed integrated and continuous disclosure system
applicable to such "reporting companies", current material information
about the issuer would be available to the public investor at all times thereby
providing the quality and degree of information in the trading markets not
presently available at the time of resale by the "non-public" purchaser.
Accordingly, the defect in the present structure that large quantities of
securities may be distributed to the investing public without adequate disclosure through the use of conduits, such as exempt or private purchasers, is
remedied by linking both the availability of such exemptions for the issuer
and the right of resale for such purchasers to the concepts of the "reporting
company" and continuous disclosure. Conversely, on the Merger Report proposals, it would follow that a "non-reporting company" would be prevented
from selling securities to an institution, exempt or private purchaser without
a prospectus or a section 59 ruling. The rationale behind this latter proposal
is not clear. The investing public is properly protected as long as the regulatory authority has the right to supervise the degree of disclosure at the time
of resale to the investing public and to prevent resales when such public
disclosure is not adequate. Many private financing situations may be envisaged
where securities of a "non-reporting company" should be permitted to be
traded to an institution or private purchaser that is perfectly willing to accept
that the securities are "restricted" and not freely salable without requiring
the issuing "non-reporting company" to become a "reporting company", to file
a prospectus or obtain a section 59 ruling prior to making a trade.
The Merger Report also recommended that the right of a shareholder to
resell securities without a prospectus that were distributed to him pursuant
to certain other section 19 (1) prospectus exemptions be dependent upon the
issuer having the status of a "reporting company". Securities distributed to
shareholders pursuant to section 19(1)8 of the Ontario Securities Act or to
employees pursuant to section 19(1)10 should, in the view of the Merger
Report, be freely resold by such holders only if the issuer is a "reporting
company" and not less than 28 days have elapsed from the filing of a timely
amendment with respect to the initial trade. 182 It would appear that in
applying the "need to know" test the Merger Report decided that neither the
shareholders nor the employees of the issuer required a prospectus standard
of disclosure in connection with the trades to them but that the purchasing
public did on resale. Contrary to the conclusion reached as to the availability
of section 19 (1)3 or section 19 (3) exemptions for "non-reporting companies",
the Merger Report recommended that section 19(1)8 and section 19(1)10
exemptions should be available for "non-reporting companies" provided resale
by such shareholders or employees was restricted.18 3
The Ontario Securities Commission subsequently shifted the emphasis
of the recommendations of the Merger Report in connection with the avail182 Id. at para. 8.06 and para. 8.07.
183 The

Merger Report states that resales by the shareholders or employees acquiring
securities of "non-reporting companies" under these exemptions be "prohibited": para.
8.12(2) and (3). It is assumed that resales would always be allowed if a prospectus or
offering circular were filed or a section 59 ruling obtained.
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ability of the exemption from the prospectus requirements for rights issues
made to shareholders pursuant to section 19 (1)8 (iii) of the Ontario Securities
Act. As noted above, the Merger Report recommended that both "nonreporting companies" and "reporting companies" should be entitled to
use the exemption as at present but that only security holders of "reporting
companies" should be entitled to resell without a prospectus 28 days after
the filing of a timely amendment. On October 14, 1971, the Ontario Securities
Commission issued its policy No. 3-22 relating to applications for exemptions
under section 19(1)8(iii) and for rulings under section 59. Such policy
statement stated that, where the proposed issuer is a "non-reporting company",
the Ontario Securities Commission "may object to any disclosure short of
an acceptable prospectus under section 19(1)8(iii) unless and until the
issuer and its insiders" assume the respective responsibilities under Parts X,
XI and XII of the Ontario Securities Act relating to proxies and proxy
solicitation, insider trading and financial disclosure. The Ontario Securities
Commission thereby indicated its intention to deny the section 19(1)8(iii)
exemption to "non-reporting companies" and has subsequently refused on
occasion to find that the information filed by "non-reporting companies"
under such section was satisfactory to permit a rights issue for the reasons
set out in the policy statement. As noted subsequently, Bill 154 adopts the
proposals of the Merger Report with respect to the availability of the prospectus exemption for rights issues by "non-reporting companies", coupled
with a prohibition on the resale of the securities so distributed without an
offering circular or a ruling. 184 If such a restriction on the resale of such
securities of "non-reporting companies" is enacted, the continuance of Ontario
Securities Commission Policy No. 3-22 would be a virtual denial of such
statutory exemption for "non-reporting companies" and, accordingly, may
be ultra vires.
The Merger Report dealt in a similar way with resales of securities
acquired pursuant to the other main exemptions from the prospectus requirements of the Ontario Securities Act in its attempt to prevent the use of such
exemptions as conduits for the distribution of securities into the public trading
markets without adequate disclosure of material corporate information about
the issuer and the securities. The Merger Report was of the view that the
right to resell securities purchased pursuant to the revised exemptions now
enacted as sections 19(1)9, 19(1)9a and 19(1)9b of the Ontario Securities
Act,18 5 as a result of the recommendations of the Merger Report,186 should
be restricted unless, where the issuer was a "reporting company", 28 days
had passed since a timely amendment was filed in respect of the trade and
there were no special selling efforts relating to the resale, or, where the issuer
18 7
was a "non-reporting company", a cornerstone prospectus was filed.
184 Bill 154,s. 93(1)(d)(iii) and s. 93(3).
185 The Securities Amendment Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c. 31, s. 3(2).
186 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at paras. 6.22 and 6.23.
1871d. at para. 6.21. In the case of reporting companies combining to form a new
entity, a cornerstone prospectus for the new entity would be required. The shareholder of
a "non-reporting company" would also have the right to obtain a section 59 ruling.
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The Merger Report proposed that the right to use the exemptions set
out in section 19(1)9, 19(1)9a and 19(1)9b would not be conditioned
upon the issuer being a "reporting company" presumably, because, applying
the "need to know" test, the shareholder of a company that is participating
in a merger or acquisition to which those sections would apply would obtain
sufficient disclosure in the merger or acquisition process.188 The restriction
on resale is based on the need to advise investors generally of the material
facts of the transaction before permitting the securities issued in the merger
and acquisition process to be freely resold.18 9
Bill 154
Bill 154 proposes to continue all the exemptions presently contained in
the Ontario Securities Act from the prospectus requirements of that statute
as exemptions from the offering circular requirements of Bill 154.190 Bill 154
does not, however, condition the right to use any such exemptions upon the
issuer of the securities being a "reporting issuer". The exemptions are equally
°
In this aspect it does not adopt the
available to "non-reporting issuers",l oa
recommendation of the Merger Report that the institutional, exempt and
private placement purchaser exemptions not be available to an issuer unless
it is a reporting company. This is a beneficial change.
It appears, however, that because of the unnecessarily severe restrictions
on the right to resell securities purchased pursuant to the offering circular
exemptions proposed by Bill 154 that "non-reporting issuers" will be virtually
unable to use the exemptions in ordinary situations. This results from the
basic recommendation of the Merger Report, adopted by Bill 154, that
every trade in securities purchased pursuant to the main offering circular
exemptions is a distributionunless the issuer of the securities,
(a) is a reporting issuer,
(b) files with the Commission an amendment to its latest cornerstone statement,
containing the details and purpose of the issue of the securities and the sizes and
numbers of the purchases, not later than ten days after the receipt of the
subscription for such securities and twenty-eight calendar days have elapsed
since the date of such filing; and

188 Id. at para. 6.19 and para. 6.26.
189 Id. at para. 6.20.
190 Bill 154, s. 93(1) and s. 94(l). Bill 154 proposes adding a new exemption relating
to sales from control groups: s. 93(1)(k).
At the present time, s. 58(l)(a) of the Ontario Securities Act requires institutional
and exempt purchasers to purchase under s. 19(1)3 "as principal for investment only and
not with a view to resale or distribution." Bill 154 proposes to limit these qualifications
to purchases by exempt purchasers: s. 93(1)(a)(v). Presumably banks, trust companies
and insurance companies purchasing under s. 93(l)(a) of Bill 154 would not be required
to satisfy these conditions. This was not recommended by the Merger Report: para.
5.22(1).
isoa The use of the adjective "purchased" in s. 93(3) of Bill 154 must mean that it applies
to resales by shareholders who have acquired their securities pursuant to the exemptions
therein referred to. This is consistent with para. 3.21(b) of the Merger Report. To restrict
the availability of the exemptions in s. 93(1) to "reporting issuers" would be unworkable.
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(c) makes no special effort whether directly or indirectly to trade the securities and
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given to others in respect of such
trade except for normal brokerage fees. 191

Accordingly, Bill 154 proposes that where the issuer of the securities
does not satisfy the conditions set forth in clauses (a) to (c) above, at the
time of the sale of the securities to the purchaser pursuant to the exemptions
therein referred to, the purchaser is restricted from reselling such securities
unless the issuer becomes a reporting issuer and an offering circular is filed
relating to the offering, 92 unless the securities acquired are listed and posted
for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange and are sold through the Exchange pursuant to a statement of material facts,1 93 unless the securities form
part of the control group of the issuer, are listed and posted for trading on
such Exchange and are sold through the Exchange "by way of isolated trades
not made in the course of continued and successive transactions of a like
nature"1 94 or unless an appropriate ruling is obtained from the Ontario
Securities Commission. 195
These are severe and apparently continuing restrictions on the right
to resell securities purchased from an issuer pursuant to such exemptions at
a time when the issuer is a "non-reporting issuer". Accordingly, the usefulness
of such exemptions for "non-reporting issuers" is drastically limited because
the number of investors prepared to purchase or acquire securities under such
conditions is sharply reduced. For instance, institutional, exempt and private
purchasers, 96 purchasers pursuant to a rights issue,1 97 purchasers pursuant
to private agreements with less than 15 shareholders, 198 purchasers selling
assets valued at not less than $100,000,1 99 promoters20 0 and employees 2° l
will not be inclined to purchase securities whose resale rights are so limited.
Similarly, it would appear that unless all the companies participating in a
statutory amalgamation, arrangement or merger 20 2 are "reporting issuers" or
unless the offeror making a take-over bid is a "reporting issuer",2 03 there
would be little reason for shareholders to approve or accept exchanges of
securities so restricted.
191 Bill 154, s. 93(3). In a"classic understatement, the Ontario Securities Commission

has noted that "the advantages [of the exemptions] to a reporting issuer become clear in
section 93". Ontario Securities Commission Weekly Summary for the week ending June
29, 1972, Supplement "X", at 18.
192 Id.s. 69.
193 Id. s. 94(l)(b).
194 Id. s. 94(1)(c).

195 Id. s. 95.
196Id. s. 93(1)(a) and (b).
197 Id. s. 93(1)(d)(ili).
198 Id. s. 93(1)(f).
199 Id.
s. 93(1)(g).
200 Id. s. 93 (1)(h).
201 Id. s. 93(1)(i).
2 2
0 Id. s. 93(1)(e)(i) and (ii).
203 Id. s. 93(1)(e)(iii).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

10, NO. I

As drafted, it is difficult to understand how a "reporting issuer" can
comply with all of the requirements of section 93(3) (b) above for all of the
exemptions. A "subscription" is not received by the issuer in every case,
especially in connection with declarations of stock dividends, distributions on a
winding-up or reorganizations 20 4 or in connection with share exchanges on
statutory amalgamations, arrangements or mergers. 20 5 An appropriate amendment should be made to this clause to refer to the filing of the amendment "after
the receipt of the subscription for or the commitment to distribute, issue or
exchange such securities, as the case may be,.. ." Similarly, the restrictions in
section 93 (3) (c)above may be more applicable to the conduct of the purchaser
in reselling the securities acquired than to the conduct of the issuer in issuing
them pursuant to an exemption. What is meant by "no special effort" and
"normal brokerage fees" in that clause in relation to an issuer negotiating a
trade under an exemption in section 93(1) of Bill 154, for instance, under
section 93(1) (a) or section 93(1) (b)?
Except in connection with the resale of securities acquired pursuant to
statutory amalgamations, statutory mergers, take-over. bids, private share
exchanges or the issuance of shares for assets, the restrictions proposed in Bill
154 relating to the resale of securities of "non-reporting issuers" purchased or
acquired pursuant to the main prospectus or offering circular exemptions
follow the recommendations of the Merger Report. The Merger Report was
generally of the view that in such circumstances "in the case of a non-reporting
company resale would be prohibited. '20 6 However, in connection with the
right to resell securities received in connection with statutory amalgamations,
statutory mergers, take-over bids, private share exchanges or the issuance
of shares for assets, the Merger Report hinted at a more flexible but equally
protective condition on the right to resell securities of "non-reporting issuers"
so acquired. The Merger Report proposed that resales by recipients of securities of "non-reporting companies" should be prohibited until a cornerstone
statement is filed or, in other words, until the issuer becomes a reporting
issuer.20 7
This approach deserves consideration. As presently proposed by Bill 154,
if the issuer is not a "reporting issuer" at the time of sale of the securities pursuant to the main exemptions, every trade by the purchaser of the securities so
purchased is a distribution. 20 8 This restriction on resale appears to continue
even if the issuer subsequently becomes a "reporting issuer" and full and
continuous disclosure is thereby made of the affairs of such issuer to the
public trading markets. If such an issuer subsequently becomes a "reporting
issuer", then it is submitted that public investors generally are not prejudiced
if the holder of securities acquired when the issuer was a "non-reporting
issuer" sells such securities into the trading markets a reasonable time after
the issuer becomes a "reporting issuer" and there are no special selling efforts
204 Id. s. 93(1)(d)(i) and (ii).
205 Id. s. 93()(e)(i) and (Hi).
206 Merger Report, supra, note 5,
207 Id. para. 6.21(1)(b).

208

Bill 154, s. 93(3)(a).

at paras. 5.25 and 8.12.
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relating to the sale. A reasonable time after an issuer becomes a "reporting
issuer", there would be equality of material corporate information concerning
the affairs of such issuer in the public trading markets available to investors
generally and accordingly, there would be no need to restrict the holder of
securities acquired when the issuer was non-reporting from reselling such
securities freely in normal brokerage transactions. The position of such a
holder would be analogous to that of a control person and the added exemption could be drafted on a basis similar to s. 93 (4) of Bill 154.209
Control Persons
The recommendations of the Merger Report relating to the right of a
"control person 210 to sell his securities are beneficial.211 Under the proposed
definition of a distribution, every trade by a control person is a distribution. 212
However, the increased rights of sale for control persons proposed by the
Merger Report outweigh the tightened terms of the definition. 213 As recommended by the Merger Report a control person may trade his securities and
a purchaser of such securities is freely entitled to resell if the issuer of the
securities is a "reporting issuer", the control person disclosed his control position
to the Ontario Securities Commission 28 days prior to the sale, the control
person sells in ordinary brokerage transactions without special selling efforts
and files a report of the sale with the Ontario Securities Commission within three
days.2 14 However, it would appear that the adjective "purchased" in section
93(4) of Bill 154 should be deleted to achieve the recommendation of the
Merger Report. Otherwise it would appear that the control person would be
free to sell under section 93(i) (k) of Bill 154 but the purchaser would be
restricted on resale unless the conditions of section 93(4) of Bill 154 were
satisfied at the time of the trade from the control person to the purchaser.
209For example, "notwithstanding subsection 3, a trade in a security purchased
pursuant to an exemption in clauses a to jof subsection 1 when the issuer of the securities
was not a reporting issuer is not a distribution if
(a) the issuer of the securities,
(i)becomes a reporting issuer;
(ii) files with the Commission in its cornerstone statement or by way of amend.
ment thereto the details and purpose of the issue of the securities and the
sizes and numbers of the purchasers and twenty-eight calendar days have
elapsed since the date of such filing: and
(b) the holder of such securities makes no special effort whether directly or
indirectly to market the securities and no commission or other remuneration
is paid or given to others in respect of such trade, except for normal brokerage
fees."
210A "control person" is defined in s. 93(5) of Bill 154. The definition does not
specifically refer to s. 1(1)10(i) of Bill 154 but a person who would be in the control group
for the purposes of s. 1(1)10(i) is a control person under s. 93(5).
211 See, Merger Report, supra,note 5, at para. 4.15.
212 Bill 154, s. 1(1)10(h).
213 At the present time, under s. 1(1)6a(h) of the Ontario Securities Act, supra, note
101, only a trade by a control person "for the purpose of distributing such securities to
the public" is a distribution.
214 Cf. Bill 154, s. 93(1)(k) and s. 93(4). The words "for the purpose of distributing such
securities" in s. 93(l)(k) are confusing. By s. l(1)10(h) any trade in securities by a control person is a "distribution".

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 10, NO. I

In addition to the above rights, a control person would continue to be
able to sell securities, where they are listed and posted for trading on The
Toronto Stock Exchange, through the facilities of the Exchange "by way of
isolated trades not made in the course of continued and successive transactions of a like nature." 215 This is a useful exemption and would have the
added benefits that the issuer of the securities does not need to be a "reporting
issuer" and there are no special statutory filing requirements.
CorporatePractice
In connection with the use of the exemptions recommended by the
Merger Report and proposed by Bill 154, certain changes in financing and
corporate practice may ensue. For instance, purchasers of securities pursuant
to the exemptions set out in section 93(1) of Bill 154 will consider it
advisable to require that the purchase agreement include conditions or covenants that the issuer become a "reporting issuer" before the closing of the
transaction, comply with the provisions of section 93(3) of Bill 154 and
maintain its status as a "reporting issuer" in order to entitie such purchasers
to resell the securities they receive without an offering circular or a section
95 ruling. In view of the fact that purchasers of securities of "non-reporting
issuers" purchased pursuant to the main offering circular exemptions would
not in turn have the right to use the exemptions in section 93(1), they may
attempt to obtain a covenant in the purchase agreement requiring the issuer to
file a cornerstone statement and offering circular qualifying their securities for
sale at their demand or to assist fully in obtaining and satisfying the conditions
of a section 95 ruling. 216 Similarly a purchaser of securities from a control
person under section 93 (1) (k) of Bill 154 as presently drafted would require
that the provisions of section 93 (4) be complied with in order to obtain full
rights of resale.
Comparisonof Bill 154 andRule 144
Two points should be noted in comparing in a general way the recommendations of the Merger Report and the proposals of Bill 154 with those
of the Wheat Report and Rule 144 adopted by the Securities and Exchange
215Section 58(2)(c) of the Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, is proposed to be
continued
by s. 94(1)(c) of Bill 154.
216
Inits release adopting Rule 144, the Securities and Exchange Commission made
a strong plea for private placees to protect themselves against the difficulties of holding
"restricted securities" by bargaining for and obtaining registration rights when they
originally acquire "restricted securities." See, Herbert S. Wander, Rule 144 Adopted
(1972), 5 The Review of Securities Regulation 957 at 962. See also, Denis T. Rice,
Potential Effects of Pending Securities and Exchange Commission Rules on Private
Financingand Business Acquisitions (1971), 23 Stanford Law Review 287, and Stephen
R. Miller and Richard S. Seltzer, The SEC's New Rule 144 (1972), 27 The Business Lawyer
1047 at 1055.
The proper remedy for breach of a covenant to become a "reporting issuer" would
be specific performance because damages would inadequately compensate the plaintiff.
The New York Supreme Court has held that a corporation's agreement to issue shares
and to register them on the next registration statement filed by the corporation must be
specifically performed: Middlemark v. Nytronics Inc., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. #93,372

(1971).
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Commission. Firstly, the Merger Report recommended that essentially private
purchasers, including institutions, exempt and private purchasers, acquiring
securities of "reporting companies" without a prospectus would be required
to wait for the relatively short period of 28 days from the date of filing a
timely amendment by the issuer in respect of the sale before being entitled to
resell the securities of the "reporting company" without filing a short form
prospectus or offering circular. 217 The Wheat Report expressed concern
that even under the expanded continuous disclosure system for "reporting
companies" that "the use of ostensible private purchasers as conduits for the
sale of securities to the public without registration be prevented" and therefore
recommended that private purchasers of securities of "reporting companies"
should be required to hold for a period of one year before being entitled to
resell publicly without registration.2 18 The Securities and Exchange Commission increased this mandatory holding period to two years219 in order to prevent the initial purchasers from acting as conduits for the sale to the public
of unregistered securities. During such two year period, the United States
purchaser may resell the "restricted securities" by a transaction which is not
a "public offering", provided that the resale is not of such a character as
to make the initial sale a public offering, and may also resell without regard
to Rule 144 in certain other limited ways. z2 0 Under the proposals of Bill 154,
the Ontario exempt purchaser could only resell the securities of the reporting
issuer during the 28 calendar day period if an offering circular were filed, certain
limited exemptions were available or a section 95 ruling obtained. 221 However,
this short 28 day period certainly does not hamper liquidity in the Canadian
markets and, assuming the existence of a high standard and constant flow of
continuing and effective disclosure from "reporting companies" of material
corporate facts into the trading markets for the benefit of the investing public as
a basis for the operation of the system, the problems of adequate disclosure to
the purchasing public at the time of resale would appear to be solved. However,
the view of the Merger Report in this regard is most generous and expresses
great optimism on the results of the future operation of the timely and continuous
disclosure system for "reporting issuers. ' 222 This is especially so in view of the
noticeable lack of analysis in the Merger Report of the quality and degree of
financial and corporate disclosure to be provided by the periodic reports and the
methods and means of disseminating to the investing public the facts contained
in the files of the Ontario Securities Commission.
217 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 5.25; Bill 154, s. 93(3). The Merger Report
cautioned against purchasers acquiring securities pursuant to the exemtpions from being

classified as "underwriters" by quick resales: para. 5.26.
218 Wheat Report, supra,note 1 at 199-200.
2 19

Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5223 (January 11, 1972). See notes 136 and 137

supra.

In addition, the United States "reporting company" must be subject to the reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for at least 90 days before Rule 144
can be used: Rule 144(c)(1) and Willkie Farr& Gallagher,CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. #78,740
(April 12, 1972).
220 Herbert S. Wander, supra, note 216 at 961.
221 See references to notes 192-195 and 217 supra.
222 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at para. 5.26.
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Secondly, both the Wheat Report and Rule 144 imposed a limit on
the quantity and method of sale of "restricted securities" that could be publicly
distributed without registration by private purchasers of "reporting companies" after the two year holding period. Essentially, and without detailing
the aggregating concepts, for over the counter securities an amount equal to
1% of the outstanding shares can be sold every six months by normal brokerage sales and, for listed securities, sales in each six month period are limited
to an amount equal to the lesser of 1% of the outstanding securities or the
average weekly volume for the four weeks prior to the filing of a notice of
sale.2 23 Under the Merger Report, a control person or a purchaser of securities
of a reporting issuer pursuant to the main exemptions may resell the securities
after 28 days from the filing of a timely amendment disclosing the control
position or the exempt sale, as the case may be, provided that the control person
or the issuer "in offering his securities for sale makes no special effort, direct or
indirect, to market the securities, and offers no special inducement to the broker
to effect sales apart from the commission normally payable on such transactions." 224 It would appear that this may in practice impose a quantity restriction
on resale bearing some relation to the breadth and depth of the market for such
securities, the number of securities to be sold and their impact upon the
market. 2
The differences in emphasis between the recommendations of the Wheat
Report and the Merger Report on the secondary distribution problem may be
rationalized to some extent by the proposition that the Wheat Report concentrated more on the status of the seller because of the essentially private
nature of the transaction between the issuer and the purchaser. As noted
earlier, the Securities and Exchange Commission was concerned that such
purchasers from reporting companies not be "acting as conduits for sale to the
public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of the issuer."2
On the other hand, the Merger Report appears to have been satisfied that the
needs of the investing public for disclosure at the time of resale by the exempt
purchaser would be adequately satisfied by the operation of the integrated
disclosure system. It is the status of the seller that is specially involved in the
recommendations of the Wheat Report and the provisions of Rule 144 relating
to the mandatory two year holding period and the quantity restrictions on resales
during a six month period.22 7 The size of the offering limitation is certainly of
223 Wheat Report, supra, note 1, at 190-199; Herbert S. Wander, supra, note 216 at
959-960 and text relating to note 136 supra. All sales under Rule 144 must be made
through ordinary brokerage transactions and without special sales solicitations or payments. The Wheat Report was concerned that large blocks of securities might be disposed
of by means of extra selling efforts.
224 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 4.15 and para. 5.25(1). See Bill 154, s.
93(3)(c) and s. 93 (4)(b)(ii).
225 For comments on the Wheat Report and Rule 144 quantity limitations that support
the Merger Report proposals, see, Hugh L. Sowards, Private Placements and Secondary
Transactions:The Wheat Report ProposalsFor Reform, 1970 Duke Law Journal 515 at
521.
220
See note 137 supra.
227 See, Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and-Some Realities
(1970), 45 New York University Law Rev. 1151 at 1162-64.
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concern to the public investor because it prevents a dislocation of the normal
trading markets by block offerings or through special efforts. However, this
concern of the public investor is probably adequately safeguarded in the Merger
Report and Bill 154 proposals by preventing resales where special sales efforts
or unusual broker compensation is involved. Nevertheless, the efficiency of
the operation of the continuing disclosure system for reporting issuers and
the meaningful and effective dissemination to the trading markets of material
corporate information periodically filed by such companies with the Commissions was clearly more unreservedly assumed by the Merger Report and is
so reflected in Bill 154.
VI. TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE
Disclosure is not useful to the investing public if the information disclosed is not current. "It is axiomatic that informational reports intended to
promote the objective of informed public markets should be as timely as
circumstances permit". 22 8 There are two basic aspects to this side of the
integrated and continuous disclosure system. Firstly, there are the statutory
time limits within which the periodic reports must be forwarded to shareholders and filed with regulatory authorities and the material therein subsequently disseminated to the public investor and, secondly, there are the
"timely disclosure" policies of the securities commissions and exchanges
relating to the timely disclosure of the current material affairs of the company.
PeriodicReports
Reference has already been made to the existing statutory requirements
under United States securities law with respect to filing the Form 10-K annual
report within 90 days of the end of the fiscal period, with respect to filing the
Form 10-Q quarterly report within 45 days of the end of each quarter and
with respect to filing the Form 8-K current report within 10 days of the end of
the month in which a material event occurs. 22 9 The present requirements of
the Ontario Securities Act are significantly less onerous and therefore less informative than those imposed on companies subject to the reporting requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The annual comparative financial
statements of companies subject to Part XII of the Ontario Securities Act
need only be filed within 170 days of the end of the fiscal period.230 In this
regard it is interesting to note that the Wheat Report found that 98% of all
companies with securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange and a
significant number of companies with securities listed on the American Stock
Exchange published annual reports to shareholders for 1967 within 90 days
or less following fiscal year-end. 231 The Merger Report did not recommend
that this existing 170 day period of the Ontario Securities Act be shortened
and Bill 154 proposes to maintain this rather lengthy period for the filing of
228
229

Wheat Report, supra,note 1 at 331.

See text commencing with note 85 supra.
230 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 120(1).
31 Wheat Report, supra, note 1 at 352.
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annual comparative financial statements.232 It is, nevertheless, a proper question whether this 170 day statutory period is too long to maintain the relevancy and currency of the financial information when many issuers, for one
reason or another, take full advantage of this period. Companies subject to
Part XII of the Ontario Securities Act are also presently required to file with
the Ontario Securities Commission comparative unaudited semi-annual financial statements containing certain pertinent information for such six-month
period.2 33 Bill 154 proposes that this requirement be continued for corporations
that are not reporting issuers and the present 60 day filing period has been
maintained.23 4 The Merger Report recommended that these semi-annual
statements be replaced by quarterly unaudited statements for reporting issuers
but did not recommend the period within which such statements should be
filed.2 35 Bill 154 adopts this recommendation and proposes that corporations
that are reporting issuers be required to file quarterly comparative unaudited
financial statements with the Ontario Securities Commission within 30 days
of the end of each quarter. 236 This 30 day statutory filing period for these
quarterly unaudited statements is reasonable and consistent with requiring
disclosure of material financial corporate events on a timely and current
basis in order to maintain an equality of essential information in the secondary
trading markets within the continuous disclosure system. This equality of
information in the trading markets is the base upon which the liberalized
proposals to solve the problems of secondary distributions and sales by
control persons are based. The recommendation for this 30 day filing period
adds weight to the arguments in favour of reducing the present 60 day period
under the corresponding policy of The Toronto Stock Exchange for the filing
of quarterly unaudited statements for listed companies.23 7
In addition to the unaudited quarterly reports, the Merger Report recommended that the Ontario Securities Act be amended to require the filing of
timely amendments, 238 presumably analogous to the Form 8-K current reports
noted earlier.239 The Merger Report indicated that the timely amendment
report may be required when a material change occurs between quarterly
reports which makes untrue or misleading any statement of a material fact
contained in any report then on file with the Commission and suggested that
specific items requiring the report be contained in the legislation. 24 This
recommendation has been adopted in part in the proposed legislation. Bill
154 proposes that a reporting issuer must file an amendment to its cornerstone statement within 10 days "where a material change occurs in the affairs
of a reporting issuer, that makes untrue or misleading any statement of a
232 Bill 154, s. 98.
233 Ontario Securities Act, supra,note 101, s. 130(1).
234 Bill 154, s. 99.
235 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at para. 2.32
236 Bill 154, s. 100.
237 The Toronto Stock Exchange Members' Manual, Division G, Part I, s. 1.02

(December, 1968).
238 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at para.2.22 and para. 2.29.
239
240

See note 91 supra.
Id. at para. 2.30.
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material fact" contained in the cornerstone statement. 241 A similar provision
requires an amendment within 10 days to an offering circular where such a
material change occurs during the period of distribution of a security.242 Bill
154 does not contain, however, specific circumstances that lead to the filing
of an amendment as suggested by the Merger Reort. It would appear that the
Form 8-K precedent would be useful in selecting some of the specific events
that should trigger a requirement to file a timely amendment. While both the
timely disclosure policies and a statutory provision requiring a filing when a
"material change occurs that makes untrue or misleading any statement of a
material fact" contained in information currently on file are useful in defining
generally the scope of the event, it would be helpful if particular matters were
specified by regulation in view of the ambiguity of the concept of materiality
and the resulting unevenness of subjective interpretation it is given.
Timely Disclosure
The present and proposed statutory requirements relating to the filing of
periodic reports are supplemented by and must be viewed in conjunction with
the "timely disclosure" policies of the Ontario Securities Commission and
The Toronto Stock Exchange. The present policies, issued in October, 1968,
are substantially similar and refer to each other. 243 The policy of the Ontario
Securities Commission states that "compliance with the requirements of the
Exchange by companies whose securities are listed thereon will normally be
viewed as compliance with the Commission's policy herein". 244 Both the timely
disclosure policy of the Commission and of the Exchange require prompt
disclosure of any "material change in the affairs of the company which might
reasonably be expected to affect materially the value of the security".
The test of materiality is, for the purposes of these policies, whether the
prompt disclosure to the public of the favourable or unfavourable facts would
have an impact on the market price of the security.245 In addition to covering
241 Bill 154, s. 66.
242 Id.s. 84.
243 Bulletin, Ontario Securities Commission, (November, 1968); The Toronto Stock
Exchange Members' Manual, Division G, Part I, s. 1.01 (October 4, 1968). See, J.R.
Kimber, Q.C., and L. Lowe, The Toronto Stock Exchange, Special Lectures of the Law
Society of Upper Canada 1972 at 201.
244 Ontario Securities Commission Uniform Act Policy No. 2-12 (April, 1971, amended
December 6, 1971).
245 The Toronto Stock Exchange's policy is based firmly on the market impact test
of materiality. "Generally, in deciding whether the change is likely to materially affect
the value of the securities, the effect of the change on the change in the market price of
the securities is the best test. If it can be reasonably expected that the announcement of
the change would result in a sudden change in the price of the security, management
should conclude that the change is one that materially affects the value of the security
and an announcement should be made": The Toronto Stock Exchange Members' Manual,
Division G, Part I, s. 1.01.
The timely disclosure policies of the Securities and Exchange Commission are
also based on whether the material event - favourable or unfavourable - might reasonably be expected to have an influence on the market price of the securities. See, Alan B.
Levenson, The Role of The SEC As A Consumer Protection Agency (1971), 27 The
Business Lawyer 61 at 69.
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the market impact test of materiality, the timely disclosure policy of the
Ontario Securities Commission has enumerated certain specific changes or
developments which it considers material and concerning which disclosure is
to be made. Such changes or developments include actual or proposed changes
in control of the company, actual or proposed acquisitions or dispositions of
material assets, proposed take-overs, mergers, consolidations, amalgamations
or re-organizations, material discoveries, changes or developments in the
company's resources, technology, products or contracts which could materially
affect the earnings of the company upwards or downwards or indicated
changes in earnings upwards or downwards of more than recent average size
and changes in dividends.24 '
The healthy concern of the Ontario Securities Commission for "timely"
disclosure is evidenced by the amendment to Uniform Act Policy No. 2-12 in
December, 1971247 listing certain of the specified material changes which it
stated "must be discussed with the Commission prior to disclosure to the
investing public ... ." The awkwardness of wording in expressing what has
subsequently been stated publicly and informally as the intent of the amendment required the Commission to issue Ontario Securities Commission Policy
No. 3-23248 to interpret the amendment. In effect, the Commission said it wished
to be "advised of the proposals", even by telephone, on a confidential basis
prior to their public disclosure "so that it may be prepared to stop trading, if
necessary, in order to afford an opportunity for the information to be released
and disseminated", especially where it appears the market is responding to
rumours and not to fact.24 9 Failure to timely disclose material events has
caused the Ontario Securities Commission to issue cease trading orders pending the necessary disclosure being made and disseminated to the public. 50
The current timely disclosure policies of the Ontario Securities Commission
and The Toronto Stock Exchange were preceded by substantially similar policies issued by the New York Stock Exchange.2 51 As stated by a Vice-President
of the New York Stock Exchange, the "Exchange's disclosure policy, or any
disclosure policy for that matter seeks to avoid any disruption of orderly market process by assuring that all investors have equal access to material information. 25 2 A double-barrelled test of assessing the probable impact on the
market of corporate changes or developments suggested by the New York
246 Ontario Securities Commission Uniform Act Policy No. 2-12.
247 Ontario Securities Commission Weekly Summary for the week ending December

2, 1971.
248 Ontario Securities Commission Weekly Summary for the week ending December
16,1971.

249 Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin (January, 1972).
250 See, for example, Peel-Elder Limited, Ontario Securities Commission Weekly
Summary for the week ending February 24, 1972 and Revenue Properties Company
Limited, Ontario Securities Commission Weekly Summary for the week ending May
4, 1972.
2 51
New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, Expanded Policy on Timely Disclosure A-18 (July, 1968).
252 Philip L. West, Timely Disclosure - The View From 11 Wall Street (1970), 24
Southwestern Law Journal 241 at 246.
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Stock Exchange is for the executive of the company involved to ask himself,
prompt me to risk my own funds?", and secondly,
"would this information
25 3
if in doubt, disclose.

The timely disclosure policies of both the Ontario Securities Commission and The Toronto Stock Exchange recognize that the interests of the
company in maintaining confidential information concerning a proposed change
or development might in certain cases cause harm to the company that would
outweigh any possible damage to the investor from withholding the information. In such circumstances, for example the commencement of negotiations
leading to a significant acquisition, the information need not be disclosed to
the public at that time. However, it is essential that the corporate insiders
who have the material information that is not being disclosed to the public
for those reasons do not take advantage of the situation to trade in the securities
of the company.
It is not within the scope of this material to deal with the problem of
insider trading and the use by insiders of a corporation, their associates or
affiliates, of "specific confidential information" for their own benefit in connection with transactions in securities of which they are insiders. 25 4 This
matter is certainly a topic that must be fully dealt with at another time.
However, the relationship between the problems of timely disclosure and
improper use of confidential corporate information by insiders is direct and
clear.25 5 To the extent that information relating to material corporate changes
or developments is fully disseminated to and absorbed by the investing public,
it ceases to be confidential. Accordingly, the problem of improper insider
trading under the Ontario Securities Act disappears upon public disclosure
because the insider no longer possesses "confidential" information.
Compliance with timely disclosure policies, is, in most instances, good
corporate practice in any event. Not only does timely disclosure of material
changes avoid securities violations for trading by insiders, it satisfies the
trading markets demands for corporate news, promotes corporate goals by
creating publicity and avoids sanctions against the corporation, including
25 6
suspension of trading, by either securities commissions or exchanges.
Effective Disclosure
While "disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure" has been
the recurrent theme throughout American and Canadian securities legislation. 5 7 important and still unsolved questions have been posed about the
253

Id. at 242.

254 Ontario Securities Act, supra,note 101, s. 113(1); Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C.

1970, c. C-32, am. S.C. 1969-70, c. 70, s. 100.4(1); Bill 154, s. 150(1).
255 See, Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied To Trading By Corporate
"Insiders" In The United States (1970), 33 The Modem Law Review 34; and Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., et al., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); affd in part and rev'd in part 401 F. 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane); cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
A
256 See, Alan R. Bromberg, Disclosure Programsfor Publicly Held Companies PracticalGuide, 1970 Duke Law Journal 1139.
2571 Loss, supra,note 6, at 21.
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nature of such disclosure - disclosure to whom and how? Unless disclosure
is effectively communicated to the investor, the fundamental purpose of the
continuous disclosure system is not achieved. The problem of effective disclosure was raised almost immediately after the enactment of the Securities
Act of 1933. A later Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and a current Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States remarked
that the average public investor would not find the complicated technicalities
of a prospectus too helpful.
But those needing investment guidance will receive small comfort from the balance
sheets, contracts, or compilation of other data revealed in the registration statement.
They either lack the training or intelligence to assimiliate them and find them useful,
or are so concerned with a speculative profit as to consider them relevant . . .
(however) even though an investor has neither the time, the money, nor intelligence
to assimilate the mass of information in the registration statement, there will be those
who can and who will do so, whenever there is a broad market. The judgment of
those experts will be reflected in the market price. Through them investors who seek
advice will be able to obtain it.258

While the ultimate usefulness of the disclosures contained in a prospectus

is unchallenged, legislators and securities administrators have attempted over
the years to increase the benefit of the prospectus by making it more concise,
readable, intelligible and relevant for the average investor.25 9 The proposals
of Bill 154 are the logical development of this trend. Public offerings may be
made only be reporting issuers260 that have previously filed a cornerstone
statement containing "full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the affairs of the issuer. '261 The reporting issuer must then file an offering circular "relating to the offering of such security", 262 which offering circu-

lar shall, "when considered together with the cornerstone statement and any
other documents, reports or material filed with the [Ontario Securities]
Commission in respect of an issuer, provide full, true and plain disclosure
of all material facts relating to the security proposed to be issued. 263 To
some extent, the concept of the offering circular incorporating by reference the
public disclosures already on file is analogous to the Form S-7 short form
registration statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission available
for established issuers reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
258 William 0. Douglas, Protecting The Investor (1933), 23 Yale Law Rev. 508 at
523-524.
259 See, Kimber Report, supra, note 3, at Part V; Wheat Report, supra, note 1, at
Ch. III; Merger Report, supra, note 5, para. 2.28 and Securities Act of 1933 Release No.
5276 (July 26, 1972).
The Securities and Exchange Commission is equally concerned with the quality of
disclosure in the quarterly and other interim reports on operations by reporting companies
and the need to supplement the statutory requirements to provide information needed
for a proper understanding of the reports. See, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 9559 (April 5, 1972).
260 Bill 154, s. 69(a).
201 Id. s. 59 and s. 62(1)(a).
262 Id. s. 69(b).
263
Id. s. 75(1)(a).
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offering securities for cash. 264 The offering circular, however, would be
mandatory for all issuers, irrespective of their size or for how long they
have been reporting issuers. In view of the fact that Bill 154 states only that
an offering circular shall comply as to form and content with the statutory
requirements and the regulations, 265 it is not possible at the present time to
determine whether the issuer and the underwriter have the right to include
material in the offering circular that has been previously included in the
cornerstone statement. The experience with the Form S-7 in the United States
has been that issuers have included material in the prospectus that has
exceeded the requirements of Form S-7,266 and it is expected that similar
results will follow with the use of the offering circular, especially for junior
or recently established issuers.
In the United States, attempts have also been made to widen the area
of dissemination of prospectuses to proposed investors during the pre-effective
period 267 and the Wheat Report stated that, as a matter of policy, "to the
extent practicable, all prospective investors in a first public offering should
receive a copy of the preliminary prospectus a reasonable time in advance of
the effective date and well in advance of the mailing to them of a confirmation
of sale. '268 The Kimber Report re-affirmed that "it is essential that a prospective purchaser should have adequate opportunity to review the prospectus
before a legal obligation to purchase arises," 269 and the Ontario Securities

Act continues the provision that a broker selling securities in the course of
a distribution to the public is required to forward a copy of the prospectus
to the proposed purchaser and that the purchase agreement is not binding
on the purchaser if he advises such broker within two days of receiving the
prospectus that he has decided not to buy the security.270 Under Bill 154, some
purchasers of a security in the course of a distribution have the right to request
264 Form S-7 short form registration statement is available for an established reporting
company under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that has complied with its financial
and proxy requirements for at least three fiscal periods, that has consolidated net income after taxes of at least $500,000 for each of the last five fiscal years and that
meets certain other conditions. See, Wheat Report, supra, note 1, at 74-77 and General
Instructions to Form S-7.
The trend towards the increased use of the short form prospectus or registration
statement is evidenced by amendments to Form S-16 under the Securities Act of 1933
which became effective August 15, 1972: Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5265 (June

27, 1972).
265 Bill 154, s. 75(1)(b). The Ontario Securities Commission has indicated that it is
intended that the offering circular should never be longer than eight pages: Ontario Securities Commission Weekly Summary for the week ending June 29, 1972, Supplement

"X' at 17.
266 Wheat Report, supra,note 1, at 76.
267 Id. Ch. IV.
268 Id. at 114.
269

Kimber Report, supra,note 3, at para. 5.24.
270 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 101, s. 64; see, Bill 154, s. 78. S.78(2) of Bill
154 needs tightening up because it appears that a purchaser may be able to re-open his
period of recission by requesting a cornerstone statement.
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the underwriter to deliver a copy of the latest cornerstone statement of the
issuer in addition to receiving a copy of the offering circular. 271
The structure of the Ontario Securities Act and the special procedures
required by the issuer and the underwriter to qualify securities for sale to the
public on the occasion of a new issue enable the distribution of prospectuses
or offering circulars to purchasers to be completed without difficulty. This
direct communication to the public investor of the document containing the
required disclosure at the time of a new issue is beneficial and, in the totality
of the disclosure system, essential. If the offering circular under Bill 154
cannot include information contained in the cornerstone statement, it is doubtful that the present level of direct communication of disclosure will be maintained. This is not to say that the decision of the average public investor to
invest or not to invest is in fact based solely on his evaluation of the technical
financial and other information disclosed in the typical prospectus. At the
very least, the delivery of the prospectus is direct disclosure of material facts
and thereby optimum disclosure to the public investor and it accordingly
provides him with the opportunity to make his own investment decision based
on such facts. This is the maximum that the disclosure philosophy can provide
and it can be achieved with relative ease on the special occasion of a new
issue,
Whether the average public investor in fact bases his investment decision
on his own judgment of the facts so disclosed to him by a prospectus and
without professional aid is subject to some doubt and to confirmation by behavioural studies. It is virtually impossible for any individual not trained in
current financial accounting, for instance, to understand the combined financial statements of companies participating in the acquisition and merger process of diversified businesses and accounting on the pooling of interests
basis. The best educated guess today is that the average lay investor probably
relies on professional investment advice to some degree in reaching investment
decisions, even when he has a prospectus before him. Some commentators
have even stated that "the concept that a prospectus enables272the investor to
act in informed fashion without professional aid is a delusion."
As noted earlier, the need of the public investor for professional investment assistance to evaluate the required disclosures in reaching investment
decisions has been recognized since 1933. The Wheat Report noted that: 273
It was recognized from the beginning that a fully effective disclosure policy would
require the reporting of complicated business facts that would have little meaning
for the average investor. Such disclosures reach average investors through a process
of filtration in which intermediaries (brokers, bankers, investment advisers, publishers
of investment advisory literature and occasionally lawyers) play a vital role.

However, that a prospective purchaser may be unable in today's complex

271 Bill 154, s. 78(l)(b). Bill 154 also provides that shareholders of reporting issuers
may obtain copies of the cornerstone statement: s. 68(2). The cross-reference in s. 78(1)(b)
to s. 68(2) of Bill 154 is confusing and limits the right to proposed purchasers who are
already shareholders of the issuer.
272 Homer Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities
(1970), 45 New York University Law Rev. 1151 at 1165.
273 Wheat Report, supra,note 1, at 52.
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financial society to make an informed investment judgment based solely on
the materials disclosed to him in a prospectus has lead a United States commentator to ask recently whether the basic purpose of the Securities Act of
1933 may not be based on false premises and to state, in the interests of
investor protection, that "it may well be that we will have to resort to means
of protection that go beyond the protection now afforded by the Federal
statutory scheme." 274 As noted earlier, the Ontario Securities Act presently
contains authority upon which to base any such additional safeguards for
investor protection and Bill 154 proposes an extension of this authority. 275
Even assuming the continued function of sophisticated interpreters of
financial information and reliance on the "filtration process," the problems
of determining the most efficient methods of disclosure of material corporate
information to the public investor in the continuing and integrated disclosure
system for reporting issuers has yet to be finally solved. Should all, some or
none of the information contained in the periodic reports required to be filed
by "reporting companies" be required to be communicated directly to the
shareholder? How far should the continuing disclosure system, as opposed to
disclosure at the occasion of a special offering, be based on direct disclosure
policies and when and how far should reliance be placed on the "process
of filtration" of material corporate information through professional security
analysts? Some advocate direct disclosure as the main policy base, arguing
"that direct communication is the key to effective disclosure... (that) unless
there is direct transmission of disclosure material, there is not real communication." 276 On the other hand, if "only the filtration process can produce informed investment decisions"2 77 direct communication of all material disclosed
under the continual disclosure system may not only be impractical and costly
but unnecessary. The Merger Report did not contemplate that all periodic
reports filed by "reporting companies" would "be delivered to investors as a
matter of securities law" 278 and, accordingly, impliedly recognized the need
to rely on the operation of the "filtration process."
It seems clear that "in the total scale of effective disclosure, mere burial
in the public file without any dissemination at all is obviously at the low end of
the scale."2 79 Similarly, the Wheat Report recognized that it would be impractical to expand the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 without first improving existing means of communicating those
reports 280 and devoted Chapter IX to a review of the "microfiche system".
The Merger Report also noted that the continuing disclosure "system recommended is ineffective if the result is merely to fill filing cabinets in the Commission's offices." '281 No examination of the problem was made in the Merger
2 4

7 A. A. Sommer, Jr., Random Thoughts on Disclosure as Consumer Protection

(1971), 27 The Business Lawyer 85 at 89.
275 See text commencing at note 49 supra.

276 Hugh L. Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of FederalSecurities Regulation
(1970), 23 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 495 at 499.
277 Homer Kripke, supra,note 272 at 1165.
278 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.40.
279 Cohen, supra, note 11 at 1352.
280 Wheat Report, supra, note 1 at 34 and at 313.
281 Merger Report, supra, note 5 at para. 2.46.
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Report and only a short reference was made to a commercial service that
282
might be available to supply copies of disclosure material on the public files.
Recently, however, the Ontario Securities Commission has commenced publishing in its Weekly Summary the information contained in Forms 11 and
12 under the regulations of the Ontario Securities Act, being the reports of
sales of securities made to and subsequent resales made by institutional and
exempt purchasers, vendors of assets in consideration for securities and private
purchasers under the executions contained in sections 19(1)3, 19(1) 9b and
19(3) of the Ontario Securities Act.283 There would seem every reason
for the Ontario Securities Commission to increase the public dissemination of disclosure material placed in its public files by the expanded use of
its Bulletin and Weekly Summary and hopefully such trend will continue.
The problem of effective disclosure of material corporate information
contained in filed public reports continues unresolved and the accessibility to
and dissemination of such information must be dealt with in the foreseeable
future.
VII. SUMMARY
The Merger Report was of the view that when "the [present] regulatory
scheme is examined as a comprehensive whole it becomes apparent that we
are extremely close to a continuing disclosure system approximating in total
a prospectus standard of disclosure." 28 4 There is little doubt that in Ontario
the base has been laid for the creation of a co-ordinated disclosure system
that, ideally, should operate so that the public files contain, at any given time,
information substantially equivalent to a current prospectus - in quantity,
quality, timeliness and accessibility - with regard to any security in which
there is active investor interest. 28 5 The Vice-Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission stated recently that Ontario is presently about two-thirds
of the way there and that goals set out in the Merger Report are those towards
which the Ontario Securities Commission is currently moving.28 6 Bill 154
proposes to complete the statutory framework within which the integrated
disclosure system will develop. Opponents to the creation of such integrated
and co-ordinated disclosure system based on concepts of reporting issuers
and the current availability of timely
information concerning issuers and their
28 7
securities appear non-existent.
282 Id. para.2.47.
283 Ontario Securities Commission Weekly Summary for week ending April 27, 1972;
Ont.Reg. 794/70, s. 11(1), as amended by Ont. Reg. 160/72.
284 Merger Report, supra,note 5 at para. 2.08.
285 Cohen, supra,note 11 at 1368.
286 Harry S. Bray, Q.C., March 4, 1972, Osgoode Hall Law School Corporate and
Securities Law Programme.
287 The Merger Report itself has been labelled as a "Chaff Report", or at best shredded
wheat, and criticized for failing "to come up with anything new or anything in any way
tailored to the Canadian scene." See, Warren M. H. Grover, A Comment on the Report of
the Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission on the Problems of Disclosure
Raised for Investors by Business Combinationsand Private Placements(1971), 23 Administrative Law Rev. 309.
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The philosophy of disclosing material facts to the investing public is
not new. The present objectives have evolved from the changed climate of
opinion about the confidentiality of corporate information and from the needs
of a rapidly expanding class of public investors for material and current facts
upon which to base investment judgments. The integrated disclosure system
also assists in solving the vexing problem of secondary distributions of securities to the public through the conduits of essentially non-public offerings without adequate disclosure to the investing public at the time of resale by the
original purchaser. The integrated disclosure system needs many refinements,
especially in the evolving areas of the quality of disclosure, including financial
disclosure, effective disclosure and the accessibility of information. Some
questions may be raised concerning the rights of an issuer to become a "reporting issuer" under Bill 154 based solely on full disclosure principles and
concerning the lack of a meaningful holding period for securities of reporting
issuers purchased pursuant to some of the exemptions of the offering circular
requirements. 288 In addition, the present lack of a national securities authority
in Canada, with the power to enforce compliance of uniform disclosure provisions throughout Canada, may hamper its effectiveness unless there is unique
cooperation between provincial legislators and securities authorities. 289 Nevertheless the integrated disclosure system is a goal to be pursued and a vital
aspect of disclosure to be expanded even if its complete refinement and
efficiency cannot be foreseen. The very nature of the judicial process, founded
on experience and the felt necessities of the time, does not allow man's
syllogisms to be so easily translated into law. In the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes, "the truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and
it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not been
absorbed or sloughed off. It will become entirely consistent only when it
ceases to grow." 290
2 88

See text relating to notes 55, 117, 137, 152 and 217 supra.
basic uniformity of present securities legislation in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia and the cooperation evidenced in the establishment
of the Canadian Provincial Securities Administrators' National Policies in April, 1971 are
favourable portents.
The address of the Federal Minister of Finance, The Honourable John N. Turner,
to The Investment Dealers' Association of Canada on June 16, 1972 indicates a revived
interest of the Federal Government to assume an active role in the securities industry. Mr.
Turner stated that in order to achieve an increased depth and breadth of our national
capital markets, "we must move in an orderly way toward the development of a uniform
national system of securities regulation and a national exchange system."
See also a report in The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1972, that a survey of the
Canadian investment community indicates several large dealers and institutions favour
setting up some sort of national securities commission.
289 The

290 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (1881, Little, Brown & Co., 49th
printing) at 36.

